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THE WORLD'S MOST SIGNIFICANT THOUGHT AND ACTION

MANEVRES IN THE » » « « « « ITALIAN CRISIS

From the illegal "La Voce", Milan.

SOME of us who are still working underground inside of Mussolini's Rome Reborn take every opportunity to read what is being written abroad concerning the Fascist war and the internal situation in Italy. There is no doubt that people will be interested in our reaction to the current judgments of the foreign experts.

To begin with, there is Louis Fischers's interview with Edmondo Rossoni, the minister of agriculture and one of the most important members of the Fascist Grand Council. Rossoni told Fischer: "Certain people believe that the world does not move, but they forget historic dynamism." Italy must expand economically. It cannot expand economically within its present limits. It must therefore expand abroad, through conquest. It would like to have Syria and Palestine. It cannot have Syria and Palestine. The bigger dogs have preempted those chunks. It will therefore take Abyssinia. "We too have a right to an empire."

We are treated here to an undisguised statement of the outlook of any capitalist State no matter where found. Fischer, as a publicist who sells his wares to the world custom, makes much of "this mystic cult of the national personality", which, according to him, has become a necessity for a regime that "finds itself in an economic and social impasse."

He does not deign to wonder if Mussolini's war had not been started in 1935 just because the shrewd "duce" saw the European (sic) situation suitable for free action in Africa. The continental powers—France and Russia—are after all most worried by what a rearméd Germany will do.

Fischer's query: "You who exercise the dictatorship, why don't you nationalize the land?" is highly naive and is on the level with the political range of the purveyor of "international diplomatics" to the American liberals. The keen Rossoni blandly parried him with the meaningless: "The dictatorship is political and not economic and social." He meant to say: "You don't understand why and when land is nationalized by a State." It is obvious that the liberal Fischer has the typical liberal's and social-democrat's idea that the nationalization of land is necessarily anti-capitalist.

More wistfulness is expressed in a very recent editorial of the "Nuovo Avanti" of Paris. It writes concerning the supposed fascist worry about its international prestige: "Where is today the prestige of Italy? Fifty nations have declared us to be the aggressor, or rather declared fascism to be the aggressor, without even taking into consideration the miserable pretenses offered by Mussolini. Sanctions have been applied for the first time against our country. From one corner of the world to another everybody laughs at Fascist diplomacy, which has realized the miracle of putting all nations in accord against Italy. People laugh at the Fascist army, which has been stopped for three months by a barbarian horde. They laugh at Mussolini, the open-air Napoleon."

The "Nuovo Avanti" then analyzes the government and popular opinion of Italy. It takes its information from the international

press: "New York Times", "Paris-Midi", the Catholic "Avant-Garde" of Brussels. It emphasizes a supposed disarray of Italian opinion and the supposed scission among Fascism, monarchy and the Church.

The "Avanti" editorialist writes: "In order to remain in power Fascism must win its war. In fact, it must win three wars: one against the Ethiopians in order to conquer Abyssinia; one against the League of Nations; and one against the Italians themselves in order to liquidate financially the consequences of its African adventure. If fascism loses the war, we shall see the vertical collapse not only of the governmental regime but also of Italian society, as it is at present constituted. There remains the hypothesis of a peace of compromise. This cannot be the work of Mussolini. It presupposes another government."

In other words, "Nuovo Avanti" in Paris expects two possible results of Mussolini's war: a socialist revolution or just the fall of the fascist government. And here it summarizes the expectations of most foreign anti-fascists.

There is always the possibility that we in Italy do not see as clearly as observers abroad. On the other hand, we are in a better position to learn what is the current reaction of the population of the country. A successful war must have the backing of the population. A revolution can only be made by the population of the country. Now while the people of Italy are grumbling here and there, it is untrue that the demands of the war have made them turn against it. As yet they do not oppose Mussolini's war.

They will begin to show opposition with defeat in Africa and privations at home. But though our sympathies are with the Ethiopians, we still doubt that Mussolini will be defeated on the Amhara tableland. In order to be defeated in Africa, Mussolini must be opposed in Europe—by the same powers that rule the roost in Geneva. Now these powers have something more important in mind. Even England, which seems to have much to lose through the Fascist defeat of the Negus Negusti. They are playing a bigger game, and may all of a sudden decide to forgive small misdemeanors. The Hoar-Laval plan was a meaningful feeler. It suggests that London and Mussolini may reach an understanding any time the European (sic) scene dictates it. The sanctions remain to date so much preaching. Does Mussolini's war machine really find it hard to buy coal and oil? No, they who are lyrically vituperous against naughty fascism over the press table in Geneva continue to supply the Italian Fascists forces with large stores of oil... Let us not be fooled by politicians' "big and small manœuvres". Our job remains sober, patient education. We, unlike our Parisian and New York friends, cannot afford to listen to fairy tales.

"When the million and a half soldiers are demobilized at the end of the war"—then Mussolini and his gang will have to pay the fiddler. Thus spake "Soda" who writes weekly encouragement from Rome. There is something to such a promise. Demobilization always presents a difficult situation to the capitalist State. But we have had a post-war situation before.

"And Italian Fascists may go left with a losing war", suggests another letter-writer. They may, because Fascism is after all a radical populist movement, and basically a reformist movement.

Our job remains not merely that of opposition to Fascism but predominantly the deeper task of agitation for a fundamental social change.

Translated by D. della R.

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By the way of explanation. This is our second monthly number. It is called the March number because willy-nilly we must abide by an immutable law of news-stand men and booksellers according to which a magazine issued on the 15th of February may not be called the number of February 15. We obey.

STRATEGY IN SOVIET-NAZI-JAP WAR

• Von xxx

From "Neue Tage-Buch", Paris.

Elsewhere we have described the Red Army, which is the instrument of Russia's military might. This half of the problem is clear. Indeed, there is no question concerning the physical and moral strength of the Soviet army. Certainly not in the minds of the general staff of the two countries which are the outstanding probable enemies of the U. S. S. R.: Germany and Japan.

But here, as always, the problems of strategy are far from clear, in particular the question: How does the Russian high command envisage the conduct of the expected wars? In effect, the problem reduces the possibility of a war on two fronts (German and Japanese); and it must take stock of these facts: Germany and Russia have no frontiers in common, but by the Franco-Soviet agreement Russia has pledged herself to step in should Germany attack France.

What Will Happen in the Far East?

It should be, however, pointed out, that the matter of a war on two fronts is not an assured thing. It is only a possibility. There is no assurance whatsoever that Japan will launch its attack jointly with Germany. Japan has its hands full with China and there is reason to believe that the Japanese general staff views the Russian "bone", which it would fain pick, with increasing wariness. Nevertheless, the plans and preparations against the eventuality of a war on two fronts have already been laid, and the most important point in this connection is the fact that today the Soviet Union regards a war with Japan as a separate military problem by itself. The immense distances between the eastern boundaries and the principal strategic bases in Central Russia and the Ural, and the resulting difficulty of communications, supplies and reinforcements, led in the very first Five-Year Plan to the creation of a self-sufficient army of defense in the far eastern territories, with a base of its own. In proportion as Japanese expansion pushed forward on the Asiatic mainland, the measures taken to insure a self-sufficient military defense of the Soviet Far East were accelerated and broadened. For example, while at the start of the first Piatiletka a total of only 300,000,000 rubles or so was provided for capital investment in the far eastern territories, the actual outlay during that period was 950,000,000 rubles. During the present second Five-Year Plan, which started in 1933 (its schedules have likewise been modified upward), provision is made for a capital expenditure of 4,070,000,000 rubles, over 25% of which is intended for heavy industry and over 40% for improvements in transportation.

Today the Far East already has its own electricity and oil, its own mining, ship-building and brick-making its own cement plants, its own canneries. And as a result of preferential conditions granted local farmers, the local supply of agricultural products keeps rapidly increasing. In addition, and in particular, Russia's chain of fortifications has been developed to a point of immense strength.

The expectation is that the far eastern army under Bluecher (with a standing force of 250,000 men) will be equal to the available Japanese army of offense, as large Japanese contingents must necessarily remain behind to occupy North China and Manchuria and so cannot be used for attack. It is the conviction that Bluecher's army is greatly superior to the Japanese army both in its equipment and mastery of the scientific weapons of war, and that, likewise, its air forces can be utilized under much more favorable conditions and with greater chances of success than the Japanese air fleet.

In addition, the mounted forces of the Mongolian People's Republic provides a mobile reserve army. In any event, a Russo-

Japanese war today would mean for the Soviet Union only this: war measures and mobilization in only one section of the country. What a change from 1905! Military writers and experts therefore agree in the opinion that a Russo-Japanese war would be only a second-rate affair, so to speak. Neither in its fierceness or extension nor in the importance of its aims and results, is it regarded as comparable to a decisive war in Europe proper.

The Western Front

In the event of such a war, the final strategical question is: where will the Russo-German front actually be formed? Where can the contending armies actually meet, considering that the two countries do not have any frontier in common?

The question resolves itself easily enough in the event Germany should direct its initial push not against France but against Russia. But should Germany attack France, decision on the geographical point at which Russia shall fulfill its pledge of alliance will rest with Russia.

Should Germany attack Russia, the situation, we repeat, is clear enough. Germany can march on Russia only through Polish territory, either through the Polish "Corridor" or Poland proper. In such an event, Poland will have to resist and so ipso facto become Russia's adversary. There can be no Polish neutrality in such an event. In a word, should Germany aim its opening attack at Russia, the actual Russo-German front will form through Poland, for in the space of only a very few hours Poland will be constrained to join with either one side or the other.

But in the event that Germany should attack France, or even Czecho-Slovakia, while Poland remained "neutral," the situation would be a much more uncertain one. Should Russia then choose to keep its pledge of alliance with France, she would face no insurmountable problems via the air; but by land she would be confronted with distressing alternatives. Either Paris and Moscow would themselves have to force Poland from her "neutral" position (for which occasion would be given by actual breach of the still existing Franco-Polish alliance, and in which case the strategic situation would be quite a clear one but with one belligerent more); or Moscow would need to make arrangements permitting its land forces to pass through Rumania to Czecho-Slovakia and from there to Germany. (This presupposes the conclusion of a Russo-Rumanian agreement along the same lines as the Franco-Russian and Czecho-Russian agreements; and this Russo-Rumanian agreement may be on the verge of signature.) The roundabout route via Rumania must not be discounted as wholly unfeasible, especially for the motorized corps. Today it is taken for granted that motorized infantry and artillery can cover as much as 400 kilometers (240 miles) in 24 hours. But the difficulties of a trek across the long winding stretch of Rumania and through Czecho-Slovakia are tremendous; and even more so perhaps are the difficulties of sending reinforcement and supplies over so roundabout a route, which, in the bargain, offers the facilities of only one railroad.

It must, therefore, be presumed that underlying the Russian plans is the thought that the fiction of Poland's remaining neutral, which in effect would amount to her assisting Germany, will prove only an artifice and collapse, like a house of cards, under the pressure of actual conditions. Even were Russia's first move (air manoeuvres aside) to consist in sending an army through Rumanian territory into Czecho-Slovakia to join forces with the Czecho-Slovakian army, the Moscow general staff still regards its main drive as having in any case to be through a Poland whose fictitious "neutrality" will by that time already have crumbled. Could this occur after Poland's finally deciding to carry out its alliance with

France, so much the better. But it is apparent that Moscow does not consider the contrary alternative to be a catastrophic one; and it may perhaps be averred that the alternative is actually regarded as more satisfactory than having to carry on operations via Rumania. Back of this is Russia's belief that Poland would not have the morale to strike with her full strength against the Red Flag for the Swastika; for it is held that a war in which Poland engaged on the side of Nazi Germany and against Soviet Russia would be a violent chemical under the action of which the country would quickly disintegrate. Poland is a country split into nationalities: the very heart of Poland is thus also its boundary line. White Russians, Ukrainians and Wolhynians who have for years resisted the Polish state will, in the main, prove poor defenders of Poland. A war against Russia, moreover, is bound to set flame to the social explosive which the years have stored up. In the Polish villages hunger stalks today and already the official press sounds an alarm that the pro-Russian and pro-Communist votes have risen. The Polish working class movement has defeated nationalist tendencies and is unfriendly to the existing regime. The middle-class and the army heads are split into two bitterly antagonistic camps on the subject of foreign policy, and the active nationalist groups of West Poland are incensed against those who favor union with Germany. Putting all these things together, it becomes clear from the viewpoint of Russian policy and Soviet military strategy why, in the event of a decisive European struggle, Poland's joining with Germany would be more welcome than Poland's remaining "neutral"; and consequently, Soviet military plans necessarily revolve about this probability.

Post-War Strategy

For the rest, Russian military leaders today have a very definite conception of strategy, fundamentally at variance with the usually accepted ones, all of which take, or used to take, as their cardinal thought the idea that the main job in future wars would fall to special elite formations. Thus, the idea of the Italian expert, Douhet, to decide the war by sudden air attack; the plan of the British Major-General Fuller, to overrun the enemy country with small, powerful, heavily armed motor troops; the idea of Seeckt, to send forward to immediate victory highly-trained shock troops and then bring up the armies of occupation to hold the territories thus won; plans, all of them, which grew directly out of the experience of the last war.

The war machine had stalled in the trenches and dugouts and the armies of men caught in a terrific impasse had threatened the entire military organization and the whole social structure with violent destruction. From this, post-war military theorists made a two-fold deduction: first, that an army must be created which, while satisfying the primary requisites of military strategy, shall at the same time make mobile warfare possible; and second, that this army must be carefully selected so that it will contain "reliable" men so as to reduce to a minimum the social and political risks which a new war would entail.

But all these hopes have withered. Even before the reintroduction of universal military service in Germany it was generally known that the very contingencies of the coming machine-and-materials warfare would necessitate the employment and utilization of all the forces of a belligerent nation. General Fuller himself, in fact, has recently modified his plan of an all-conquering tank army in favor of a modernized mass army; while faith in the decisive character of air warfare has now waned almost to the zero point.

So far as Russia is concerned, none of these theories and suggestions were ever taken to be any more than half-truths from which certain elements might judiciously be extracted. From Seeckt the Soviet military men took the idea of a cadre army; from Douhet, recognition of the strategic value of an air fleet; from Fuller, the plan of a motorized shock army and from the French system of defense the practice of erecting fortifications along the border. All these things together, taken in the balance

along with the immense reserves of trained man power, on the one hand, and the Communist credo, on the other, have shaped the military power which the Soviets present today: a politicalized army, numbering millions and possessing an all-around highly-developed equipment and technique. And it is for an army of this calibre that the Soviet plan of strategy has been formulated.

The Isserson Plan

This plan and the theory behind it is given in a comprehensive work published some time ago by the "red" General Isserson. Isserson's book was thoroughly discussed at the Academy of the General Staff and all its formulae and guiding principles, except for an occasional modification or addition, received the express approval of those in authority. Especially noteworthy is their acceptance of the Isserson proposal to change from a strategy of line formation to a strategy of depth formation in echelon. This change from the broad to the deep front means that in operation the front, including the reserves, will form a depth of 60 to 100 kilometers. Consequently the aggressor will be obliged to inflict defeat upon the entire operating depth by a series of rapidly succeeding battles. This implies the end of the one-act military operation carried on within a restricted area. However, the depth formation is intended for use not only in defense but attack, in fact from the very moment of mobilization. The object in view is to obtain, so to speak, a cumulative increase in force and pressure. The operating echelon of the mobile army will form the first strategic formation; behind it, as the second and third formations, will come the strategic echelons of the reserves. The forward most operating echelon of the first strategic formation will consist of the massed air fleet. On the ground, the fleet will be followed by the tanks and motorized cavalry as a strategic echelon, their function being to confuse the approaching enemy and take up important positions ahead of his line of march. Behind will follow, in succeeding waves, the large infantry units of the first formation. While these have gotten under way, the second strategic formation will take shape within the country, and will consist of the echelons of the now mobile troops of the second line. This, according to General Isserson, is the strategy of massed forces. Along the Franco-German border the girdle of forts would make a war of position appear probable; but in the east a war of movement appears the most likely.

Along the 800 kilometers of borderline between Russia and Poland, the front will hardly be an unbroken one; and for that reason, if for no other, it should provide the opportunity to create operative flanks. Again, the war of movement is the resultant of a breach and consequently the problem of a break-through becomes for the "red" General Staff the central problem of its tactics. The first attacking wave, however deeply echeloned and however successful in its operations, can at best make tactical and not operative gains; for its function consists to a certain extent in effecting a breach. A complete break through the depth alignment, on the other hand, would require an attack by at least two and probably more operating waves. Finally, victory will go to the side having the greater depth in the operating formation of its forces. From this follows one definite conclusion: that in numbers the armed forces can never be too great. To take Schlieffen's dictum that only that side can win whose front is the broader and wings the stronger, the doctrine under present conditions comes to mean that victory will go to the one whose front is the deeper and whose depth alignment is the stronger.

The final resistance of the enemy must be overcome through a mass of wheeled artillery and infantry and armored trucks that can be poured in like an avalanche. All in all, the Russian idea obviously rests on the view that the coming war will be one of long duration and that only toward the close of operations should the complete military forces of the country be brought into play. In this view, the Russian strategy stands in sharp contrast and contradiction with the German idea, which would once more stake everything upon the forcing of an immediate decisive victory. Over against the Isserson view stands the following German dic-

DEBUNKING THE ANTI-HITLER FRONT

• Karl Heinrichsen

From "Zeitschrift fuer Sozialismus", Karlsbad, Czechoslovakia.

This is the most sober statement on German fascism written to date. The poetry and fervor that flavors the customary anti-fascist thesis are missing here. Heinrichsen calls things by their names and reaches unwelcome conclusions which may, after all is said and declaimed, be entirely correct.

THE vulgar-marxist legend of a Hitler fabricated by the capitalist powers in order to continue their rule under the cover of the National-Socialist Party apparatus still confuses some heads. Even the mighty refutation offered by the Nuernberg Party Day and the occurrences of the following few weeks has not been understood by many anti-fascists. With ever new variations, Hitler is presented to us as the "prisoner" of the Reichswehr, Big Business or the Junkers. The right evaluation of the historic function of fascism as an obstruction rising on the road to social revolution has led to false conclusions as to the nature of the fascist dictatorship. In reality this dictatorship is not exercised at anybody's order but through its own sovereign power. The Reichswehr stands now under Hitler's command in the same way that the old army before the war stood at the command of the "first war lord". The direct influence of the Big Bourgeoisie and the Junker caste in the Third Reich is no greater, and on the looks of it smaller, than it was in the Weimar Republic.

The Independent Role of Fascism

Not the Reichswehr, large industry, nor the landowners destroyed the Weimar Republic. It was destroyed by the fascist mass movement embodied in the NSAP. To be sure the latter effected relations with the old reactionaries, but there was never any question of its sharing of power with others. Fascist dictatorship is something different from the rule of the big bourgeoisie. This is true even in Italy, where this dictatorship was exercised for so long (not with the same results as in Germany) and where the retention of the monarchy merely proves the permanence of a governmental regime which is after all nothing more than a coalition government. It took Mussolini years to attain what Hitler was enabled to put over in a few weeks: to do away completely with parliamentarism, democratic freedom and opposition parties. But the totalitarian character of the regime won out even in Italy. The opposition of the social-conservative circles of Italy could not stop the Abyssinian adventure. King Victor Emanuel, who, according to reports, was only waiting for the opportunity to get rid of the inconvenient dictator, was obliged to express openly his solidarity with the fascist program of conquest.

The so-called feudal lords of the Third Reich, the "leaders" of heavy industry, the junkers from the east bank of the Elbe, have for some time been eating out of Hitler's hand. It is not the power of these elements but solely the anti-socialist nature of the fascist movement that bars the way to the nationalization of the means of production in the Third Reich. We must learn to recognize the independent role of fascism. A regime is not necessarily big-bourgeois because it is anti-socialist. There is still an-

tum: "The strategy of tomorrow must aim at the concentration of all available forces in the very first days of the war. So stunning must the effects of a surprise be that the enemy shall be deprived of all opportunity to organize his defense."

This strategic view comes from the "Militaer-Wochenblatt". Actually it is a simple iteration of the old German doctrine of the Vabanque move.

Translated by L. Bertrand.

other kind of political order. This our vulgar-marxists cannot grasp, though Marx has provided them with a classic analysis of its prototype, Bonapartism. Hitler and Mussolini rule because they dispose of a State apparatus. But they dispose of the State apparatus because they—unpleasant though it may ring in the ears of the anti-fascist—have behind them a popular movement and are supported by the broad national opinion. Public opinion may be made. It may be influenced by the ruling groups in spite of the dissatisfaction of the majority of the people. But that is another question.

The road taken by National Socialism, was prepared for it by other persons and groups. Some of them had the illusion that they were using Hitler as a tool. The Hitlerite movement understood this. It has reduced these fellow travellers to an unimportant position.

A "Prisoner" Hitler?

Who prepared the way for Hitler? In the first line stand the mistakes of the German Republic and the parties that supported the Weimar regime. Then come, in order, the Reichswehr, the Stahlhelm, the German Nationalist Party, the circle around Hindenburg, the big agrarians and German heavy industry. However, just as the opponents of National Socialism failed to dam its advance, so were its temporary fellow travellers unable to bend it to their own ends. The man who after 1923 promised to follow his "excellency" Kahr "as a faithful dog" today commands obedience from the bearers of the most illustrious names of Imperial Germany. The "secret capitalist powers behind the scene" exist only in the phantasy of the anti-fascist in need of a rationalizing formula. Schacht, Fritsch, Meissner, Neurath and the other non-Nazi dignitaries of the Third Reich, hold their position only as a result of the daily renewed act of "coordination" and certainly do not possess more influence over the "Fuehrer" than is exercised by his old and new friends, as Hess, Rosenberg, Ribbentrop, Streicher, Amman, Schwarz, Brueckner, Hanfstaengel and the Party named ministers as Goering, Goebbels and Frick. That other old friends of Hitler's, as Strasser, Roehm and Feder, were shoved aside, does not alter matters. The latter did not fall as sacrifices to some power behind the scenes but because they wanted to follow a different course than that decided on by Hitler and their party. This does not in any way belie the ordinary picture of the uncertain, impulsive, easily influenced, suspicious, neurasthenic Hitler. On the contrary the fact that Hitler is essentially so weak and insignificant and yet is not the "prisoner" of the old reactionaries is a conclusive proof that the Nazi dictatorship stands on its own legs and not on crutches borrowed from Big Business or the feudal caste. It would be possible to explain the Third Reich as something other than the result of a political movement represented by National-Socialism only by having recourse to a picture of the overtopping personality of the "fuehrer" (or what would amount to the same thing, the existence of some "dark eminence", a strong man behind the "fuehrer"). But this supposition is obviously unfounded.

All concessions allowed by National-Socialism, both before and after the seizure of power, to various non-Nazi social groups, parties, organizations, interests and persons, were dictated by political tactics and had a corresponding character. Hitler was not able to hand over the entire apparatus of the totalitarian State to his followers. In the same way Bolshevism was obliged to entrust very important functions to "specialists", among whom were many "class enemies". National-Socialism, however, recognizes no class enemies. It knows only "traitors to the national community" and keeps the door open to any possibilities of individual "coordination".

It is hard to speak of the "prisoner Hitler" in view of the transformation of the Reichswehr into a National-Socialist "Volksheer" (national army), in view of the abolition of the rival "Stahlhelm", in view of the destruction of the Catholic societies and press and the suppression of the influence of the Church in the education of the youth, in view of the vain protests of German industrialists against the economically noxious effects of Nazi race agitation, in view of the dissolution of the student corporations for alleged non-Nazi atmosphere. Socialists ought to be the last to see in Hitler's failure to carry out the "socialist" part of his program an indication that the Nazi movement has fallen under "bourgeois" influence.

The German bourgeoisie has received from the Hitler regime far heavier blows than it got from the nobility in the 19th century and from the proletariat after the November revolution. A Germany ruled by the big bourgeoisie, the junkers and the general staff of the army would present a totally different appearance from that of the Third Reich. After the events of the last few months, it is hazardous to speak of a "normalization" of the National-Socialist movement. The deception roused by the 30th of June 1934 was soon corrected. The "Thermidor" of German fascism did not do the bourgeois reaction much good.

More important than a complete political abolition of the old rights is the social change that took place in the Third Reich. In all activities, new men rose to governmental power, taking away positions from the old office-holding stratum. While the Weimar Republic satisfied itself with a superficial change at the top of the administration, a change that was later annulled with a stroke of the pen, National-Socialism intrenched itself from the top to the bottom of the State apparatus. Declarations of loyalty did not suffice. Nazidom insisted on complete capitulation. It viewed even the result of its governmental and industrial "coordination" with distrust and sought to bend all social agencies to its own needs.

The Social Background of Nazism

Ideologically, National-Socialism can be traced to a definite ancestry: the Prussian conception of the State and Prussian militarism; the organic "blood and soil" attitude of the "Jungromantik" toward the nation and society; the Hegelian idealization of the State; the nationalist-liberal interpretation of history; the ultramontanism and political utilitarianism of the Bismarkian period; the race theorizing common at the beginning of the century; the imperialism of the recent industrialization period; the anti-intellectualism of the youth movement; the organizational principles of the Prussian general staff, which during the Ludendorff dictatorship of the last war years took on a "totalitarian" turn.

But the bearers of these ideologies became the small bourgeois and declassed elements from other social layers. In fascism all these elements fused with the mass experience of the post-war period, which not only took unto itself the ideas of anti-liberal, and anti-bourgeois, collectivism but also the tendency to indemnify an unsatisfied yearning for justice by glorifying violence, the tendency to proscribe reason in favor of a sweet mythology in which a generation harried by the uncertainty of existence and the cruelty of the crisis could lose itself. In view of the popular spurning of the socialist way out of the crisis; in view of the failure of the old bourgeois attempts to mend the situation, there remained only the fascist experiment, which has not been devised by some capitalists scheming behind the scenes but is a product of the structural changes and inner contradictions and the inter-group struggle within contemporary capitalist society.

This does not suggest the clearcut division of fronts—here the revolutionary proletariat and here the bourgeoisie intrenched in fascism—that the Communists, to their and our hurt, described for us during the first advance of the Nazis against the bourgeois republic and democracy...

The real united front against fascism can only be a bourgeois-socialist front. For the "progressive" forces of capitalism, whose development is stifled by the Nazi attempts at autarchy and its nationalist and military eccentricities, also stand in opposition to

fascism.

Only a careful analysis of the social forces on hand will enable us to tell the natural enemies of fascism from its allies. The branches of industry that profit from the limitation of foreign competition or from the war preparations are willy-nilly bound to the National-Socialist regime. The big landowners know that no government coming after Hitler will sacrifice millions of marks in the continuation of the present agrarian policy. The bureaucracy of the present "coordination" system, the judges and officials who have become the tools of the Brown Terror, cannot hope to survive in office when Hitler's Third Reich is gone.

How Long Can They Last?

The possibilities of the dictatorship, and therefore those of the mentioned sections, will not become exhausted all at once. A new epoch of National-Socialist promises opened up with the rearmament and when the method of winning power in easy stages was carried over from internal to foreign politics. The realization of the "paradise" has now been postponed as far as the great mass of the unpolitically-minded is concerned. Here, too, has the foreign enemy of the Third Reich suffered the fate of the "inner enemy"; that is, complete impotence. Theoretically, at least, there is the possibility that the manoeuvre that led to the present conditions in the inner politics should be just as successful in foreign politics. As long as there remains abroad the hope of satisfying Hitler Germany by the means of partial concessions, the hope of diverting Hitler with an offer of participation in the government of the world, the hope of leading Nazi Germany on the road to "normalcy",—so long has the Third Reich a chance. The dictator's freedom of action on the foreign field is even greater than it is at home. Hitler could get the German people to receive as a friend and ally the same Poland that was considered Germany's traditional enemy after the war. He received the approval of the plebiscite when he left the League of Nations. He will certainly receive popular approval upon reentering the League. The belief of the individuals directing the Third Reich that they may do anything with the help of propaganda has not yet been denied by events. Hitlerite Germany is the only power feared as the source of a serious disturbance of European peace. The Nazi leaders are the only ones who can afford to play with the present supreme interest of the powers—the maintenance of this peace. They live in the hope of being able to do one day in the midst of a favorable European situation, what Mussolini dares only in Abyssinia. At least, the attitude of England justifies them to expect that when the time for action arrives (say, in connection with the Lithuanian question), it will be condoned as easily as Mussolini's colonial adventure.

But Hitler is not really obliged to risk his regime in a war. The foreign political situation is powerful enough an influence to divert popular attention from internal difficulties. There are today in Germany more people who believe that the rearmament and Hitler's program for territorial revision have fully justified the country's sacrifices than there are convinced Nazis. There is no doubt that Hitler's dictatorship will not be destroyed as a result of the fear of the Reichswehr and the big bourgeoisie that the country will be inveigled into a helpless war. Neither in the field of foreign politics do the mythical "successors" to Hitler's place exist.

We of the anti-fascist ranks must therefore, accustom ourselves to count with the dictatorship, as a definite power. We must stop looking behind our own backs for the real enemy or for them who are to prepare the way for Hitler's fall. And should the dictatorship find it suitable, one day, to do away with the National-Socialist Party, that would merely go to prove that Hitler and his circle actually rule, and because they take into consideration the opinion of all sections of the people, do not really depend exclusively on a single one. Here lies the Hitlerites' strength but also their weakness. The day will come when, excepting for the immediate beneficiaries of the dictatorship, nobody will want to die for it.

Translated by F. H.

WHAT NEXT IN SPAIN?

• Robert Louzon

From "Révolution Proletarienne", Paris.

"Children sing in Spain". Not so freely now. There's censorship in Spain. The shrewdest observer is a traveling Frenchman. Below are the facts as noted by the well-known labor theorist just before the General Election.

All the comrades I saw were in agreement in their estimate of the general political situation. That was several weeks before the resignation of Chapaprieta but sometime after the "gambling scandal" bared again the enormous corruption of the Radical Party, which is in Spain, as in some other countries, the "party of thieves" par excellence. The scandal not only obliged the chief leader of the thieves and radicalism, Lerroux himself, to leave his post as president of the council but it also considerably weakened and dislocated the Radical Party. Since the latter in partnership with the Clerical Party of Gil Robles, constituted the "governmental bloc" in power since the last elections, the decomposition of the Radicals only left two issues possible. Either the clerical and "philofascist" Robles (as he is called in Spain) would take advantage of the occasion in order to assume power by himself, even by means of a coup d'état, or the dissolution of the governmental bloc would render impossible the composition of a government having the majority in the Chamber and would lead to the dissolution of the latter.

No Coup d'Etat

All the comrades I spoke to agreed that of the two solutions the second will eventuate. For Gil Robles would not dare to try a coup d'état, and if he tried he would fail.

A coup like Primo de Rivera's on the part of Gil Robles could have been expected because Robles, as minister of war, had the means of putting at "strategic" positions generals devoted to him. But even a strictly military coup seemed hardly plausible for several reasons. First, it was probable that a considerable part of the army, even the officers and high functionaries, would not march. Furthermore, the army, the discipline of which is very lax, is a relatively feeble force in Spain. What counts there as an armed force is not the army proper but the armed police, that is the Guardia Civil, the assault guards and the carabineros. Now this police army is not controlled by the Minister of War (this would leave desolate our own Daladier!). So that the president of the republic, Alcala Zamora, could always rely on his own generals, and it is well known that Zamora did not want a coup d'état.

It is understood that these are only the immediate circumstances working against a coup and that they, in turn, are due to more profound causes.

It seems to me that the most important of them is the Asturian insurrection. I say advisedly the Asturian insurrection and not the October movement, because outside of the Asturias, and notably in Barcelona, the movement was not serious.

The Asturian insurrection was a spontaneous wave. It was due entirely to the initiative of local militants. It was not prepared nor ordered by the central organizations, though some good people made such claims. The rapidity with which the insurrection broke out; the manner with which it embraced the entire worker population, including women, enrolling about 50,000 combattants; the enthusiasm that animated that mass; the sacrifices that they accepted without wincing for 15 days—all this worker heroism revealed to everybody, and especially the bourgeois, the depth of the popular feeling.

More or less consciously, the bourgeoisie concluded that such emotions could not be slighted with impunity beyond a certain limit. This limit was the continuation of the Republic.

It has been said that if the French Republic was maintained

after 1871 it was due to the Paris Commune. One can say now that if the Spanish Republic survived it was due to the Commune of the Asturias.

The expectations of our comrades were up to now confirmed by consequent events. Chapaprieta, unable to get a vote on his financial projects because his majority had decomposed, was obliged to resign. Gil Robles did not try his coup, although the president of the Republic refused to confide to his care the formation of the new government. And the ministry of Portela Valladares, in which the minister of war is no longer Gil Robles, was merely formed to dissolve the Chamber and to proceed with new elections.

The first stage foreseen by our comrades—election in Spring or later—appears to have been attained.

What Will the Election Bring?

What will take place at election time and after?

Here too opinions are unanimous. In these elections the "lefts" will be victorious.

They will win because even in the last elections it was the "lefts" who had the majority of votes. If they did not get the majority of deputies last time, it was because at that time the left went to the polls more divided than the rights. But this time it is almost certain that the left parties will be enabled to present a single list.

Furthermore, the lefts will win because they plainly ought to attract a greater number of votes. The parties of the right showed their total powerlessness during their one year of power.

While the lefts will be victorious, their victory will not be as brilliant as in the elections that immediately followed the Revolution. It will, however, assure them a majority.

And after?

After? The first act of the left will be to vote an amnesty.

"The amnesty is what counts with us", my friends told me. "There are now at least 30,000 in the prisons as a result of October. The first job is to free them, and the elections will give us the means."

An anarchist militant of Barcelona told me that he considered the usual abstaining policy of the C. N. T. highly out of place in the present situation. (The C. N. T.—National Federation of Labor—is the Spanish trade union organization. It keeps itself independent from all political parties, and opposes the U. G. T., a trade union body allied to the Socialist Party of Spain.)

"The 30,000 prisoners", he told me, "have relatives, wives, children, brothers and sisters. Altogether they must number at least 150,000 persons, workers, revolutionaries, or sympathizers, all directly interested in amnesty. How do you expect them to abstain from voting if they know that amnesty depends on their vote?"

Again: the Symbol Azaña

And after the amnesty?

"After, the real fight will begin", I was told by a comrade in Valencia.

"What do you mean?"

"Do you know Azaña?"

"As well as anybody else."

"Well, Azaña, the last president of the Cortes Council, who was barely elected to the present Chamber, who is the leader of a small party now reduced to a handful of deputies—this person enjoys at present a most formidable reputation all over Spain. He is the symbolic personage around whom gather all republicans: intellectuals, shopkeepers and workers. He has become—not the inspirer—but the flag of an unprecedented anti-reactionary coalition.

(continued on page 39)

THE TOTAL WAR

• Field-Marshal von Ludendorff

WAR is the supreme effort of a nation for the conservation of its existence. That is why, in time of peace, the objective of "totalitarian" politics should be to prepare the people for this life or death struggle and to create bases solid enough not to break down in the stress of the fight.

The innermost nature of war has been changed. The character of world politics has also changed. That is why there is the imperative need of modifying the position of politics on the conduct of war. Every bit of Clausewitz's theory must now be thrown into the waste basket. War and politics have one purpose: to assure the continued existence of a people. War is the supreme manifestation of the national will to live. That is why the political activity of the country must be subordinated to the conduct of military operations.

Offensive or Defensive

It is foolish to discuss, in the manner of Clausewitz and certain theorists of today, whether offensive or defensive, constitute the ideal form of war, or whether letting the enemy approach and not passing to the offensive till the enemy's strength is depleted, is the summum of military art. These are dangerous subtleties which may play havoc with the seriousness and simplicity of the "total" war. Just as two and two make four, so it is evident that it is easier to resist when you are in a favorable position and behind solid defence than it is for the attacking force to reduce the defensive position. Thus understood, the defensive may appear more favorable than the offensive even in battles during which entire armies come to grips.

In spite of this, the offensive remains the decisive form of combat, and that is what counts in the long run. The weaker belligerent will resort to it every time his opponent gives him the opportunity. In the spirit of the offensive reigns the proud feeling of its superiority this imponderable which assures to a well directed attack an unquestionable advantage even over an enemy that is numerically superior.

Submarine and Air Warfare

The attempts to suppress the total submarine war, that is to say, a war in which even neutral vessels are pitilessly sunk by underwater belligerents as soon as they are noticed in the war zone—such attempts, I say, will remain pious wishes. The same thing is true about the proposed outlawing of the air bombardment of the civil population during hostilities. The requirements of the operations in the course of the total war, the efforts of a people in defence of its existence, are more important than gratuitous theoretic wishes. The submarine and airplane have completely transformed the old forms of blockade.

No Declaration of War

It is an error to believe that war must necessarily open with a declaration that hostilities are on. Japan began hostilities against China in 1894 and against Russia in 1904 by simply attacking the Chinese and Russian vessels. Similarly England began its war against the Boers by the "volunteers" raid. The ill-timed declarations of war made by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to Russia and France in 1914 are still unforgettably. They furnished the enemy propaganda slogans that have strengthened the morale of the enemy and weakened our own people. Generally speaking, a nation has no comprehension of a war of aggression but understands only a war of legitimate defence. Now in a declaration of war, one may read too easily the will to aggression...

In the case of the German people in 1914, there was really an attack from the West, yet the nation actually believed that we were carrying on a war of aggression, therefore a war of conquest, which did not delay in destroying in the German people the feeling that it was fighting for its existence. The German people could not understand—not having received an adequate military education—that a defensive war such as the one that was imposed on us had to be managed by the way of the offensive, if we were not to be crushed. A preliminary education of the people is therefore especially necessary, since the entire nation and each individual cannot fight with full might unless fully convinced that it is a question of survival.

Mobilization

Immediately after the decision to fight has been reached, the following branches should be in complete readiness for action: the air forces, cavalry divisions, certain infantry formations, some light units of the navy and, of course, the means of transport necessary for economic warfare. The mobilization of the other branches should then proceed with the greatest rapidity. Other land formations, the remaining air and naval forces should stand to on the second day. By the fifth day, all units existing in peace time should have been reinforced and finished their preparations.

A few days more may be allowed to the reserves, the "landwehr" and the base formations. At the same time "ersatz" battalions should be formed.

I allow for these delays because I base myself on our past experience. The better supplied the military formations are in time of peace, the more rapid will be the mobilization. France can put its permanent army on a war footing in a very short time.

The Plan of War

There is no infallible formula that may be applied to the initial disposal of the armies. The following simple maxim is however wise. No army in the world will be strong enough if a decision is sought at a point chosen before by the opponent. At all other points it is best to throw into balance only the forces strictly necessary. With an undaunted will, the very last gun should be used there where it is absolutely needed. Great strength of spirit is required to close one's eyes to other possibilities (recognizing, nevertheless, their gravity) and to leave to the war genius the task of making the most of the situation as he sees it.

Care must be taken that the mobilization instructions should not exceed its exact framework. Without doubt, it is best to foresee, by the manner of grouping the troops in the mobilization zone, all future operations, but in no case should these plans prejudice the march of operations beyond the first news concerning the positions of the enemy. Here theoretic considerations end and give place to the realities of the war. The latter does not allow for a strict execution of previous plans. It demands the exploitation of the weaknesses of the enemy. It is good to trace a general line, but one must not expect the enemy to do precisely what was foreseen when the plan of mobilization was drafted...

The Schlieffen plan against France suited perfectly the situation of 1904-1905, but it did not suit 1914, when one could expect with certainty the advance of the French toward Lorraine. General Moltke modified the plan, but he could not free himself from it entirely and therefore could not utilize to the full the weak points offered by the enemy. Thus the management of the campaign was marked by hesitation. A war chief cannot utilize the plan of another unless he can make it his own.

ON LUDENDORFF'S TOTAL WAR

• by Karl Radek

From "Izvestia." Moscow.

THE German press keeps silent about the recent publication of General Ludendorff's "Total War". The book has, however, found many readers among the German officers.

After running through this article, the reader will understand why the German press acts in this manner in regard to the literary work of the man who was commander in chief of the German forces during the World War and to whom, in spite of his differences of opinion with the leaders of the party in power, the German Ministry of War erects statues in his life time.

The "Total War" discloses numerous personal elements about Ludendorff's after-war life and ideas, but it is not essentially the expression of the specific insanity affecting the author. In more than one way it reflects the outlook of German fascism and the General Staff of the German Army.

The fact is that Ludendorff's book is a document of great political importance, which will play a paramount role in making clear to the masses of Europe the enormous dangers offered by the several factors making for a new world war.

The first thing noticed is that Ludendorff does not bother about analyzing the international situation. He does not attempt to prove that someone is preparing a war against Germany. For he proceeds from the premise that a new World War is inevitable. War is for him an invariable law. He considers all attempts to reduce armaments, all endeavors to unite the noose that threatens to stifle humanity, as rebellion against commonsense and history. When Germany was getting ready for war before 1914, the heralds of this war, with General Bernhardt at their head, attempted to prove that Germany was threatened on all sides, that England, France and Russia were striving to surround Germany in order to destroy her growing industries as a dangerous competitor. Similarly, Herr Hitler, preparing for a new World War feels obliged to present the laughable thesis that Germany is threatened from the U. S. S. R., or, as he likes to say, International Communism.

Ludendorff is not occupied with such camouflage. He simply speaks of the future war and outlines its preliminary measures, avoiding even passing mention of the likely opponents of Germany.

There is nothing surprising about that. Ludendorff considers the future war to be only policy that can be followed and to which one should strive. For this reason he begins his book by attacking Clausewitz, the father of German military theory. Clausewitz saw war as an extension of politics. He meant that a study of the politics preceding a war will give the aims of that war. It is, therefore, necessary to remember always the limits of the conflict

as decided by the policies of the belligerent countries. War was for Clausewitz one of the possible instruments of progress.

Now Ludendorff considers this at least one hundred years old. In his opinion war is the only possible form of politics today. And war is the only road of history. Here he begins and from this he draws all his conclusions.

Here are Ludendorff's conclusions. First of all, the politics of a country should serve exclusively, in every section, the single and paramount cause—war. Secondly, while Clausewitz conceived of several kinds of war—from one amounting only to throwing some military influence on the scale of history to an exhausting universal war, whose outcome will decide the life and death of the country,—Ludendorff recognizes only the universal, total war, during which there will be staked on the cards of history not only the existence of the country but the existence of the entire population: men, women and children. He therefore, sees the necessity of conducting this war with absolute ruthlessness, and considering nothing outside of the sole aim of destroying the enemy.

Attempts to limit chemical warfare make him laugh. He calls them hypocritical (p. 44):

"Bombardment from the air of the defenceless population, of unprotected cities, etc. does not correspond with the customs and traditions of war as established by international law, which permits only the bombardment of fortified places. But in a fight for life or death, no nation can deny itself the use of all military means that might also be used against it."

It goes without saying that Ludendorff is against the formality of declaring war. Once you decide to fight, you rush the enemy.

At the very moment when Germany in its naval treaty with England promises not to sink merchant ships by the means of submarines without taking preliminary measures to save the crew and passengers, Ludendorff writes in his book:

"The tendency to limit total submarine warfare; that is, the sinking by submarines of any ship encountered in a certain zone, in spite of its neutral flag, will remain an unfulfilled wish. The same is true of attempts to prohibit air bombardment of the peaceful population of a combatant nation. The demands of the total war, the desire of the nations to defend their life, will become the order of the day, putting aside the petty theatrical attempts to abolish unlimited warfare. (p. 84)".

The German government can say, as Ludendorff himself states in his book, that he is expressing here only his personal opinions. However, such a statement can have no meaning. First of all, the German government proved that, when it wants, it can suppress the expression of all personal opinions, especially when views against war are concerned. This is best proved by the tens of thousands of German communists and simple friends of peace, groaning in German concentration camps today. It is proved by the sufferings of a man like Karl Ossietzky. The fact is that by authorizing such propaganda as Ludendorff's, the German takes into account the repercussion that it will have among the tens of thousands of German officers who will be called on to determine the methods used in the coming war.

* * *

General Ludendorff's folly is not merely the folly of a military expert on the loose. His conception of war is the brutal expression of the very nature of fascism. Fascism attains power when the bourgeoisie of a country has reached the conclusion that the only way out for it is the military road. When Ludendorff screams: "The nature of war has changed! The nature of politics has changed! The relation of politics to military management should be changed! Clausewitz's theories have been all overthrown!"—he is merely expressing a view common to all fascists. They need war and are firmly determined to subject everything

The Chief of the Armies

The supreme military chief is the man who is to conduct through his intelligence, will and courage, the total war in which the existence of his people is at stake. Nobody can relieve him of the responsibility he has assumed. He who conducts the total war should rule the life of the entire nation. In all activities, the will of the supreme chief must be decisive. Only the war can demonstrate if the man who directs the operations is the right war leader.

For no reason whatsoever may the chief be relegated to a second or third place under the pretext that he does not possess sufficient authority or that he is too young.

Real war chiefs are rare in the history of a people. Only experience can show if the leader in time of peace will be suitable in time of war. The nation merits such a chief only if it places itself entirely in his hands during the total war fought to preserve its existence. The chief and the people, therefore, complement each other. The war leader cannot succeed otherwise.

to war.

From this basic premise, Ludendorff draws his conclusion about the management of the State. If the entire life of society is to be subjected to the aim of preparing for war and then to the life or death conflict, it follows that the director of the war should also direct the State.

Now all this is not merely a fit of senile ambition. He declares that not only the general staff but even the government should be subjected to the supreme military chief. The latter is the State. He is the decisive source of all power.

"The war must be conducted on the basis of his own conclusions and according to his directions... No one can relieve him of the responsibility of any section of the total war (p. 11)..."

The cycle is closing. The monopolist bourgeoisie of the nations that were most affected by the last World War and are impregnated with a coming socialist revolution—it created fascist parties in order to prepare better for war. The destruction of worker organizations, the acceleration of armaments, the concentration of power in the form of fascist dictatorship, all this serves preparation for war. When this preparation has reached a certain stage, militarism declares: "Since war is the only way out, give power to him who can best direct the war. The war will not be conducted by former infantry sergeants or captains of the air-fleet. It can only be conducted by a soldier who has been trained in all the military branches and has experience with all arms. The commander of the army must command the country and the State. Everything must be subjected to him."

Ludendorff remarks that he has not himself in mind. He is an old man. He may possibly not live long enough to experience the joys of the total war.

"It is inadmissible that, for one reason or another, the leader should be relegated to a second or third place under the pretext that he does not possess sufficient authority or is too young (p. 11)."

Ludendorff speaks in the name of the superior officers, in the name of the generals. According to the reports of the foreign press, it is known that the leading military circles of Germany have already expressed the conviction that the fascists as a party would not have enough authority to conduct the war. They have advanced the idea of a triumvirate composed of Hitler, Goering and the future commander in chief, effective power being concentrated in the hands of the latter. Ludendorff is against a "compromise" of this kind. In his entire book he fails to mention once either the National Socialist Party or Hitler. He simply proclaims the need of subordinating Germany to the commander in chief. It is a mistake to see in this the delirium of a crazy old man who considers himself a "savior". We have always combatted those who permitted themselves to exaggerate the importance of the reports of dissension between the military circles of Germany and the leaders of the German fascist party. We have always insisted that the general staff of the army recognized the enormous services rendered to it by the fascists, and while the army aspires to augment its influence over the government, it has no intentions of changing the government at present. But it would also be a mistake to slight the tendency to create, in case of war, a military dictatorship, which would merely utilize the fascists as police and an agency of mass propaganda. The very fact that the German government has not decided to confiscate Ludendorff's brochure shows that it has probably taken into account the force of the tendency expressed in the book.

This tendency is supported by the conviction common in military circles that national socialism has at its disposal ideas that will help to strengthen the front in time of war. Ludendorff borrows some of these ideas from fascism: anti-Semitism, the race theory. But the central idea by the means of which he wants to unify the victims that will be placed on the battlefields is that of the "native German" religion.

He demands a radical break with Christianity, since it is a universal religion and therefore interferes with the unity of a nation at war, making difficult the opposition of one people against another. He envies the Japanese because they have a national

religion in Shintoism. He holds up, as a war weapon, the German religion invented by himself. Here he exposes the political aim that impelled the German fascists to their race propaganda. The source of this racial nonsense was the desire to make Germans believe that wherever they were they formed a unit; and to attract to Germany the Scandinavian countries, Holland and Austria. With the aid of the idea of German racial superiority the fascists tried to get the future members of the German army to believe that they were the salt of the earth and everything was permissible to them.

Ludendorff crowns his work with a call for the institution of a national religion and the break of all cultural relations between the German people and the rest of the world. The German people is the bearer of the idea of the nordic race. It has its own national religion. It is the master of other peoples. These are the beliefs that Ludendorff wants to implant in the German army, now getting ready to march.

And here begin the trials and tribulations of the future dictator. Ludendorff admits, not without some bitterness, that it is not enough to feed the cursed masses on the idea of the nordic race and it is not enough to put a German idol in every soldier's knapsack.

"Man", muses Ludendorff philosophically, "must eat in order to be able to work and make war. Horses and cattle can be kept alive only with the aid of fodder. Machines must have fuel in order to move (p. 37)."

Because of the imperfect nature of human beings, horses and cattle, the war dictator will have to direct the economy of his country.

General Ludendorff discloses himself in full. Through twenty pages he emits meaningless sounds about all kinds of economic problems. But he cannot say how the economy of the country should be organized. He cannot say how he will secure the unity of the country at the time when speculators and the kings of trusts will make billions and the population will starve.

He knows what to do with the discontented. They will be shot. But what will be done with those whose excessive love of profits will provoke the indignation of the masses? A dictator can say nothing about this. Ludendorff mumbles nonsense about justice and the righteousness of social relations.

So concludes the marshal's song. We leave to specialists the analysis of the chapter dealing with modern weapons and methods of conducting war. The important thing about Ludendorff's book is that it expresses the tendency toward the military dictatorship, a tendency that issues from the conception of the destructive war to which fascism is heading. If militarism is afraid that a fascist dictatorship will not be able to realize the unity of action necessary for a total war, Ludendorff's book demonstrates the weakness of a dictatorship representing only the naked coercion of the military over the popular masses, as well as the helplessness of the military before monopoly capitalism.

Ludendorff's work presents the perspective of a wild destructive war in which the future of the bourgeoisie will be fully entrusted to the officer's saber. But when Ludendorff expresses his misgivings about the mood of the masses in a long war, you can hear the saber on which capitalism is leaning begin to crack.

Ludendorff's book should be made known to all Europe and the whole world. It shows the war danger descending on humanity. It shows how that war danger takes on the characteristics of insanity which does not consider anything outside of its own phantasmagoria, the raving vision of a Germany ruling the whole world. But the book shows at the same time the mental emasculation and physical bankruptcy of the enemy threatening humanity.

There is much personal Cesarist insanity in Ludendorff's book, but its fundamental traits are those of the insanity of a dying social order. It will, however, not get the opportunity to dominate a world of individuals healthy in body and mind, who build a new world and wish to distinguish themselves only through their devotion to the cause of humanity.

Translated by E. R.

AND WHO IS BECK?

• by Jan Cisek

From "Pritomnost", Praha

WE cannot judge Pan Joseph Beck by the vague books written about him. To trace his portrait, we resort to his acts, just as vague. Vagueness is Beck's outstanding characteristic.

We do not care to run the risk of misconstruing the acts of the Foreign Minister of a nation that is so near to us and with which we should like to live in perfect accord. We shall therefore resort to the "Kurjer Warszawski" in order to show that the conduct of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs seems just as enigmatic to his own compatriots. A short while ago we could read in that paper that "the Polish delegation at Geneva practices the most secretive diplomatic methods. Thus, for example, nobody can explain for what reasons Poland observes a policy of such extreme reserve toward the Little Entente. Nobody knows what Poland will do if the project of the pact comes on the order of the day. Nobody can foresee what attitude Poland will take in regards to Italy. A Polish citizen knows gross modo what Mussolini is after, what Hitler thinks, what Litvinov wants. A Polish citizen knows the political line of a Laval or of an Hoare. But he knows nothing about the Polish foreign policy".

The Destiny of a Soldier

A glance cast at Beck's forty years might suggest that he was a destined artillery officer. On the day he was born in a humble official's family of Warsaw, his future patron was a revolutionary, twenty-seven years of age, publishing in Vilna the "Robotnik", a secret paper that called for revolt against the Tsar. The Russian police sought in vain the printing press of the "Robotnik" for six years. The editor and distributor of illegal literature, an escaped political prisoner, a conspirator daring to make deals with the Japanese Imperial government, Joseph Pilsudski was then at the head of a revolutionary organization. Surrounded by Polish patriots, he undertook dangerous expeditions into the Tsar's empire and directed in person attacks on railway trains.

Then the war broke out. The Polish Legion was formed. Joseph Beck, then 20 years old, left a commercial school to enlist in the legion. Four years of service in Pilsudski's army had changed him into a professional soldier. When the war was over, Joseph Beck, a lieutenant of artillery, mixed with the enthusiastic crowds greeting the triumphant entry of his general into the city of Warsaw. The same year, he reached the first ranks. He did that staying close to Rydz-Smigly, Pilsudski's best friend. In 1918 was formed the army that was to attack Ukraine to the new "Greater" Poland. By 1919, Beck passed through a military school and was a soldier by career.

In 1919 and 1920, he took part in the campaign against the Soviet Union. The situation of the Poles was desperate. The Bolshevik troops were before Warsaw. Then in August 1920 came the "miracle of the Vistula". The Russian army, disorganized, tired, fighting without respite for six years, was defeated. Poland acquired vast territories. Pilsudski was called the savior of his country, and Joseph Beck was always at his side. Military critics were the only ones to suggest that the battle of the Vistula was not a victory by Pilsudski but General Weygand's victory, that is, the victory of the French General Staff, which was the strategic brain of the operation.

Then Joseph Beck ceased being a soldier pure and simple. He entered the field of diplomacy. After 1919 he was a member of the military mission that was sent to Roumania. In 1921 he went to Brussels as a military expert at the Lithuanian conference. In 1922 and 1923, he was military attaché in Paris. According to

Waldemar Grimm's biographical study, Beck was in Paris before and was made to leave France as a result of certain dramatic incidents. But no confirmation of this is found elsewhere. Grimm writes:

"In the young State, Beck cooperated in the formation of the General Staff. Everything was still in full ebullition. Therefore the young man had little difficulty in climbing the ladder. He was sent to Paris as a military expert at the Peace Conference. However, the young Pole failed to inspire General Foch's confidence. The latter ordered to have Beck watched and then concluded it was best to keep the captain as far from Paris as possible. Foch's note suffice to have the prefect of police expel from the country an active Polish soldier who appeared to have too close relations with Germany."

But there is no confirmation of this detail. It is, nevertheless, true that later Beck clearly showed to all Europe his sympathy with military Germany.

In 1923 the embittered marshal withdrew from public life and went into seclusion at Sulejovki. But in the eyes of the army he was still the country's savior. Poland was ripe for the dictatorship. Now a State subjected to a dictatorship was just the right means for the rise of a man like Joseph Beck.

Standing on Poniatowski Bridge, Pilsudski rejected the offer made him by President Wojchichowski. In three days' time the marshal was the master of Warsaw. The coup d'état resulted in three hundred dead men and two thousands wounded. The government resigned. Pilsudski consented to have the presidency of the republic offered to him. He needed the gesture in order to give the appearance of legality to his coup. He refused the presidency, contenting himself with the War Ministry, which assured him the power of a dictator.

And the second personage in the new government became Joseph Beck. Three years before, he, speaking grand demagogic phrases, accompanied Pilsudski into retirement. At that time the army sweetened for him the bitterness of loss of power by naming him colonel. He did not leave the marshal after that. He heard everything old Pilsudski said. He became the marshal's shadow. When Pilsudski acquired the dictatorship, Beck was made Chief of the Staff. He took charge of all of Pilsudski's relations with the outside world. When the dictator fell sick, Joseph Beck was the only person entering his room. In 1930, he was made vice-president of the Council, then Minister of State and finally Secretary of State in charge of foreign affairs.

He Admires the Third Reich

On the 2nd of December, 1932, two months before Hitler's accession to power, Joseph Beck became the Foreign Minister of Poland.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Beck did not naturally decide the foreign policy of Poland. The "grand old man" gave precise directions.

After the retirement of the hesitant and nonchalant August Zaleski, the foreign policy of Poland had not yet undergone great modifications. Poland continued to assure France of its friendship and the solidarity of the alliance. Quite a useful non-aggression pact was concluded with the Soviets. Friendly relations were maintained with Czechoslovakia and Roumania.

It looked as if the foreign policy of Poland would not be modified. But in January 1934, one year after Beck's and Hitler's rise to governmental power, a pact was concluded between Germany and Poland, by which both States promised not to attack each other. People understood now why Poland had so vehemently refused to subscribe to the project of an "Eastern Locarno" and

From "Critica", Buenos Aires.

THE death of the Venezuelan tyrant Juan Vincente Gomez presents one of the most tragic pages of history lived through by any one country of our America. Neither Rosas of Argentina, Dr. Francia of Paraguay, Lilis of Santo Domingo, Calles of Mexico, nor Machado of Cuba shed so much blood or oppressed their countries so ruthlessly as this Venezuelan from the Andes, whom José Vasconcelos so aptly christened Juan Bionte (Juan the Buffalo).

For 26 years Gomez governed Venezuela exactly as a plantation owner might rule his private African estate. During this long period of Venezuelan national life, Gomez administered his domain, dictated its international policies, ceded territory to neighboring countries, made concessions of oil fields to foreigners, and treated the industry and agriculture of the country as the private property of himself and the members of his family. His personal fortune, for that very reason, is incalculable, and equally incalculable are the descendants of this criollo who never succumbed to the marriage bond.

The life of this tyrant will be remembered by posterity as proof of the prophetic insight of the greatest of our liberators, Simon Bolívar. When Bolívar saw the Gauchos of Paez, in military uniform, grabbing control of South America, he exclaimed, "I have labored in vain." He thus predicted the destiny of his own country, Venezuela, which, after attaining heroism in the War of Independence, was doomed to descend into comic farce with Cipriano Castro, and then into bloody farce with Juan Vincente Gomez.

spurned very proposal for a mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia.

The German-Polish treaty was signed sixteen months before the marshal's death, that is, at the time when the old man was already extremely ill. There is no doubt that the pact was concluded with Pilsudski's consent, but there is just as little doubt that its chief instigator in Poland was Colonel Joseph Beck. Was this at last his opportunity to leave the sidelines? This man had forfeited his youth. He was not able to satisfy his ambition in the legion. He had up to now failed in all his attempts to raise himself into the highest spheres of diplomacy. After his first promotion, he found himself obliged to follow the old marshal into exile. When appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, he remained no less a simple executive of the dictator's thoughts. And for this man Beck the moment now came when his name would be pronounced by all Europe and read at breakfast in all papers.

His Obsession

Joseph Beck has concentrated his entire ambition toward one aim: to have Poland considered a great power, to see France, England and Italy treat Poland as an equal. This dream is not naturally Beck's own conception. It dates from long ago and haunted the minds of the Polish politicians some years back when M. Herriot visited their country. Colonel Beck made the idea his own. Being, after all, a soldier, he sees in this desire for a "Great" Poland a command that must be executed at any price. The tragedy lies in that Beck is a soldier among diplomats. Understanding only the principles of the political ruse, he thinks that the nature of what one asks matters little. The important things it to ask at a time when your partners are obliged to give.

He has therefore inaugurated in the foreign policy of Poland the tactic of extortion. And he is quite surprised when success does not come. Poland is not acquiring the importance it has been hoping for. A soldier of the old school, a admirer of German military methods, a disciple of Pilsudski, who expected only command and passive obedience, Pan Joseph Beck is surprised to see that European politics do not obey either smart strutting on polished floors or the saber thrown rudely into the scale...

Translated by M. V. P.

NOW THAT

Juan Vincente was born in a hamlet of the Andean region, of very humble folk. Thanks to a very charitable godfather, the cattle herder learned to read, write and count. This was the only formal education that Gomez got throughout his whole life; but he was intelligent, wide awake, active, and was possessed of an ambition that soon reached beyond the boundaries of the fields where he herded his cattle.

In 1900 the former cowboy was already dictating proclamations which began: "Leaders, officers, soldiers of my army, heroic sons of Táchira". Gomez foresaw his future clearly. He had very opportunely forsaken his cattle to join one of the many revolutionary bands wandering about the country. He soon acquired enough authority to build up his own body of followers. Gomez, cunning Gaucho that he was, could sense the changes in the political firmament. When the star of Cipriano Castro was rising in the heavens where formerly the sun of Bolívar had shone, Juan Vincente lost no time in forming an alliance with General Castro.

A Sinister History

Serving in the armies of Castro, the future tyrant performed his first act of boldness. One night in the encampment, Gomez woke with a start. He had just had a dream. He saw himself marching over the plain till he arrived at La Puerta, a strategic spot where Bolívar had suffered several defeats. At this entrance to the plain, Gomez discovered the enemy's forces, waiting to deal a death blow to Castro's army. Gomez in his dream gave battle to the enemy and cut them to pieces. The moment Castro heard the tale of his subordinate, narrated with the contagious fervor of a visionary, he ordered Gomez to act out his dream. Gomez set out at once, and exactly as he had foretold met and routed the enemy's army at La Puerta, scoring a victory for his general. From that day Gomez was Castro's advisor and right hand man. Months later, Cipriano sat in the presidential chair, and Juan Vincente was vice president.

During the chaotic presidency of Castro, when the dictator, in a fit of megalomania, was beginning to defy the entire world, Gomez quietly began to build up a reputation. When the German government sent its warships into Venezuelan waters to collect its loans, Castro, in bold defiance, opened fire on the ships sent to intimidate him and shattered the smokestack of one of the German destroyers with his cannon. Gomez thereupon entered into negotiations with the German agents, and later with the Yankees, with the French, with all the foreign powers, and laid the foundations for his later coup.

Everything worked out to his heart's desire. In 1909 Castro became seriously ill, and his physicians recommended that he go to Germany for an operation. But Castro, in his great love for Venezuela, hesitated to deprive the country of his presence. He departed, but not until he had arranged to have Gomez temporarily occupy the presidential chair. In order better to assure himself of the fidelity of his friend, Castro, according to the custom of the plains, made Gomez the godfather of his child. At the moment when Castro, in Germany, went under the surgeon's knife, his friend Gomez called out his soldiers and betook himself to the barracks where the Castrist forces, under the command of one of the President's sons, were stationed. Gomez slapped the face of the officer of the guard, and gained control of the barracks by surprise. The coup d'état was consummated. In a bombastic decree Gomez declared Castro deposed as president of the republic and himself consecrated as the "Rehabilitator of Venezuela".

Castro was not a man to be frightened by an act of this kind.

GOMEZ IS DEAD

• by Fernando Robles

His operation scars barely healed, he boarded a ship and with just one aide-de-camp as a following, arrived in Venezuela, determined to regain the presidency. But the political panorama had changed during his absence. Gomez enjoyed the approval of the foreign powers and could rely upon his army. Castro was unable to land and started upon a truly pathetic Odyssey, with no port willing to receive him until at last Santo Domingo accorded him its hospitality. Castro died in exile, still dreaming of the execution of the disloyal godfather of his child.

From 1909 until yesterday, Gomez governed Venezuela. For a number of years he was president. When he was not president, he affected the simple title of "supreme commander of the army". But during all this time not a leaf on a Venezuelan tree stirred without the approval of the dictator. Yet it was neither easy nor tranquil. Although in the War of Independence the Venezuelan people had already suffered a blood-letting which practically wiped out its aristocracy, there was constant rebellion against this tyrant who had neither the lustre of statesmanship nor the glory of military success to redeem him. During his 26 years of government, Gomez had to suppress 70 revolutions, imprison and kill thousands of prominent citizens, and exile no less than 300,000 opponents.

All South Americans who have travelled have come upon entire colonies of exiled Venezuelans,—in Cucuta, Colombia, Curaçao, Trinidad, Aruba, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo, the Antilles, Panama, Mexico, and New York—in America; and in Paris and Berlin—in Europe. On the rolls of those who live in exile will be found all the historical names of Venezuela and the whole upper stratum of its present intellectual class, with Rómulo Gallegos, the great novelist, at their head.

Bread and Clubs

The tyrant followed a policy of bread and cudgels. To them who bowed to his will, went public posts, fat-salaried offices, the dazzling light of high station and diplomatic rank, plus wealth. For the others, the stubborn ones, the rebels, who invoked the memory of the liberators Bolívar and Sucre—for them was la Rotonda with its infected subterranean dungeons, life imprisonment, economic ruin, misery, and death. In all justice it must be said that Venezuela preferred misery and death to the ignominy of submission. Precisely for this reason there are 300,000 exiled Venezuelans scattered throughout the world.

The obstinate heroism of the patriots persisted. Let us recall, for example, a recent expedition which for sheer courage brings to mind the exploits of the colonial period. A handful of rebels managed to gain control of the island of Curaçao, a Dutch possession. They armed themselves with the rifles taken from the Dutch colonial forces, and, seizing a German passenger ship, embarked and headed for Venezuela. When they landed the expeditionary forces were met by 10,000 of Gomez's soldiers and cut to pieces.

There was another attempt to land. This attempt met with no greater success, ending in the death of its leader and some thirty aristocratic Venezuelan youths, descendants of the Liberators.

Finally, in 1932, General Urbina managed to organize a liberating expedition in Mexico. The Mexican youth responded enthusiastically to this project, and in a short time filled to capacity a boat that had been chartered for the purpose. They too had to face the army of Gomez upon disembarking. The expeditionary force consisted of 200, all Mexicans except the general. Fifty gave up their lives for the liberty of their sister country. The rest, trapped, their ammunition exhausted, fell into the hands

of the government troops. Gomez spared their lives and sent them back to Mexico after treating them with unwonted generosity.

Students in the Struggle for Liberty

The students, for their part, never stopped their agitation for liberty. That is why, in 1930, Gomez announced: "If they don't want to study let them build roads." He sent them to the most unhealthy sections of the tropics to build highways under the lash of his sergeants. Many died on the roads. When the mothers come out in the streets to demonstrate on behalf of their sons, Gomez turned his machine guns on them. It was then that a girl of fifteen, Carmen Gil, mounted the pulpit of the most aristocratic church of Caracas and, as the priest was raising the host, cried: "Venezuelans, let us send up to the Lord a prayer for the freedom of our country and the eternal glory of the souls of our students who are dying at this very moment on the highways, condemned by the tyrant." There was a flurry of terror. No one till then had dared raise his voice against Gomez. The priest himself thought of running away. But religious faith and patriotism triumphed. Kneeling, all present joined in the prayer of the heroic girl. Upon leaving the church, however, Carmen Gil was arrested and subsequently deported.

La Rotonda is the tyrant's monument. In that fortress he stifled all cries for liberty. There, Carlos de Leon, a noble citizen who dared to oppose Gomez for the presidency, was tortured, and there journalists, writers, students and simple patriots who dared to criticize the regime even in the privacy of their homes, spent the best years of their lives.

Gomez succeeded, through intimidation and by his monopolistic grip on the country, in becoming a multi-millionaire. His estates extended to the very boundaries of Venezuela, and the industries he owned included all those in the country. He was at once cattleman, dealer in radios, coffee planter, and textile manufacturer. Gomez was Venezuela, and Venezuela was Gomez.

Since every estate requires a spacious residence for its owner, Gomez created Maracay. Shrewd Gaucho that he was, he always felt a distrust for the city with its literate citizens. He preferred country folk and went to live among them. Maracay was transformed into a ridiculous caricature of Versailles. The diplomatic corps was never absent from the audiences of the President, which were held in the stable while Gomez was supervising the milking of his cows. There was no lack of literary quacks who saw in this a Biblical idyll. García Naranjo, for one, unblushingly devoted a book to this thesis and managed to sell the work to the tyrant at a fancy price.

His Favorite Amusement: Cock Fights

In his dotage, Gomez developed a lively passion for the movies. Five nights a week he attended the cinema theatre of Maracay, which naturally was one of his private enterprises. When he arrived, a battalion presented arms and intoned the Venezuelan national hymn. His sons (innumerable though he never married) enjoyed all the prerogatives of royal princes and were received everywhere with the strains of the national anthem.

But the favorite amusement of the tyrant was cock-fights. Every Sunday he was present at the contests, and there were no breeding coops in the country to compare with his. José M. Capo, a Cuban journalist, describes this typical amusement of Venezuela, and especially of Maracay, the Versailles of Gomez, in the following passage:

I am present at a cockfight. The cockpit is big; there are some five hundred people present. Among the spectators are the ministers who come each week to Maracay to receive orders from the Meritorious One. Several cocks are already disabled. The audience has become aroused at the contagious excitement of the general; sun, blood, cocks with torn feathers.

DO NOT LIE ABOUT BOLIVIA!

• Juan Andrade

From "Claridad", Buenos Aires.

The capitalist conquest of the globe brings into the backward countries certain bastard social forms in which slavery and serfdom mix strangely with capitalist exploitation of human labor. Of this Bolivia is a fine exhibit. And in Bolivia, too, the best sort of people speak glibly of "planned economy".

THE problems now posed in Bolivia are of an almost transparent clearness. It is therefore useless to attempt to complicate them with metaphysical considerations and a nebulous phraseology, as Don Bautista Saavedra, the chief of the "Republican-Socialist" Party and former president of the republic, found it necessary to do in the manifesto that he has just addressed to the country.

Bolivia—why not speak plainly?—is a semi-colonial country. It is dominated by foreign money power. The latter finds in the country two conditions that are extremely favorable to its enterprises: important sources of raw material and a cheap labor market.

"We have need of capital", shouts Saavedra in his manifesto. But the capital that the head of the Republican-Socialist Party (a name which in our country has nothing in common with its real content) calls for is never given to "save the country". This capital comes into most South American countries from the United States or England. It seeped into Bolivia in the form of loans and concessions. It always ends by controlling the important wheels of national politics.

Bolivia being governed and controlled by American finance, it

is easy to imagine the mechanism of this planned economy while—let us not forget—the country is bound by loans contracted in New York to the Stifel and Nicolaus concerns; while 114,000 shares of the Banco Central remain in the hands of New York creditors and in view of the handing over, by Saavedra himself, of 4 million hectares of petroleum fields to the Standard Oil. (These fields are situated in the departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija and Chuquisaca, which border on the Great Chaco.) Can we fail to conclude that in view of these facts, the State devoted to the pursuit of "planned economy" promised by Saavedra and his friends will be anything else but the watchdog of Yankee capital? The present government, as well as the preceding, has been just that in the measure that it has defended the interests of our kind of feudal lord.

The Example of Mexico

When representatives of the existing regime speak of attempts to conciliate liberal economy with measures of "socialization", it is best to turn to the Mexican experience. The case of Mexico is particularly characteristic of all Latin American countries, subjected in varying degrees to Anglo-American capital.

Animated by good intentions but lacking a systematic program and a strong worker party, the present directors of the Mexican republic thought they could make up for this lack by a policy of "planned economy", not free, by the way, from very much confusion.

They have managed the distribution of land on a large scale, giving 4 millions hectares to the peasants. They have set on foot

ers! Suddenly, near my seat, there is uttered a phrase which passes from mouth to mouth, like a ball tossed about by baseball players; it runs round the cockpit, comes down to the front rows, rises again and is now a sonorous murmur. "What has happened?" "The General has gone away."

Soon the explanation is forthcoming, and the people recover their composure.

"The General has stopped out for a breath of fresh air."

The sentence goes round and round, in a direct line, then rebounds... Finally, after the sentence has been formed by every lip, a faint echo can still be heard.

A few brief moments pass, during which time the cockfight has been interrupted.

The audience breathes again. Satisfaction is depicted on every face.

"The General is coming back!"

And the echo is repeated: "The General is coming back."

This is the atmosphere of servility and tyranny in which Venezuelans lived under Gomez. His eulogists have often proclaimed that Venezuela has no foreign debt, that its treasury is in a flourishing condition, that the country has been covered with a network of highways... All this is true. The first thing the proprietor of an estate tries to do is to pay off the mortgage.

Gomez did just that, but in so doing he took Venezuela away from the Venezuelan and made it his private property. The poverty of the inhabitants is known to all travellers. As for the roads, they are, to be sure, the best in South America. There was just one thing wrong with them. They were not open to all Venezuelans nor to all kinds of traffic, since the General wanted them always kept free for troop movements destined to suppress revolutionary uprisings—his eternal nightmare. On the other hand, Venezuela, the richest of all South American countries in petroleum, is the

one that benefitted least from its natural resources. The Yankees themselves declare that Gomez decreed the most liberal legislation in the world for foreign enterprises. North American capital invested in petroleum exceeds 750 million dollars, but the Venezuelan state cannot call its own a single barrel of this precious liquid. Crude oil leaves Venezuela to be refined as far away as Aruba, a tiny Dutch possession which the Yankees use to deprive the Venezuelans of even this profit.

Youth on the march

At present, there is on foot in Venezuela a nationalist democratic movement which has enlisted the sympathy of the entire youth. At the head of this movement is a young scientist, Dr. Manuel Pulido Mendez, who, though only 35 years old, has already suffered all kinds of persecution, including imprisonment and more than fifteen years of exile, because, while still in the secondary school, he had signed a proclamation against the tyrant. Among the patriots most honorable mention has been earned by Lopez Bustamante. He lives in New York, and single-handed save for the help of his daughters, edits a review called "America Futura". At the present time this review constitutes the loftiest tribute of the free intellect of our race, and has become famous because of the gravity and courage of the campaigns it has launched from within the very entrails of North American skyscrapers. I must also cite Jorge Luciani, the historian, a man of fiery language, and Blanco Fombona, the novelist, whose anger has the terrible majesty of a volcanic eruption. But it would be necessary to fill pages and pages to pay just tribute to the courage and sacrifice of thousands of exiles who have preferred the hunger and hardships of banishment to the largesse of Gomez who flung gold to his followers just as he tossed fresh hay to his animals.

Translated by I. H.

an "hallucinating" constitution. They have spoken of social revolution. The most advanced circles in South America have put their hopes in the Mexican experience, in the power of attraction of this anti-imperialist program of social transformation.

Now the results obtained by President Cardenas are said to have been so far very meager. In spite of all its "revolutionary" avowals, Mexico, continues to drag along the ball and chain of Yankee imperialism. The "socialist" generals of Mexico, like the best of our own politicians, talk of a managed economy, but the fact remains that this economy is directed to a great extent by Wall Street. All that Wall Street needs to do is to bear down on the nerve centers of the neighbor country all the weight of the one billion five hundred million dollars owed it by the Mexican government.

Bolivia will even be less able to "direct" its economy if an attempt is really made to satisfy the interests of the masses, as long as it must put up with the control of the "Permanent Fiscal Commission", an organism that is under the surveillance of the creditors of the State and the large national and foreign companies.

Haciendas, Mines and Indian Servitude.

The Bolivian people are poor, backward and miserable. Far from the sea, on the high plateau it occupies, no bourgeoisie could be born or prosper in the occidental manner. There the landed proprietor with a retarded mentality has remained master. The Church has helped a great deal to keep the rural Bolivian masses in their persisting pitiable position of peasants without land, dirty, ragged, superstitious.

On this feudal regime, foreign capital, for which Bolivia was an easy conquest during the last boom, incrustated itself. Nobody in the country, and the landed proprietors least of all, realized the extraordinary importance of the machine. No Bolivian bothered about working, or even learning the natural riches hidden in the underoil of the country. American and English money took charge of the exploitation of the natural wealth of Bolivia.

So far, the best Bolivia could offer socially has expressed itself through its typical lawyers, abstract bachelors of art and innocent young girls. The Bolivian towns still conserve a colonial appearance, and their inhabitants still give proof to a medieval outlook. Even the recently accelerated rhythm of exchange has failed to modify, in the least way, the feudal sensitiveness of the landed proprietors, masters of haciendas and Indians.

The state of affairs has continued up to now thanks to the existence in the country of a category of inhabitants that lend themselves readily to exploitation—the Indians. The Bolivian Republic is 100 years old. For 100 years the directing strata of this independent republic—whose political attitude has never been republican—have lived on the backs of the Indians.

In order to raise the standard of living of the agricultural workers, certain politicians, and Saavedra is one of them, want to encourage white immigration. We do not know whether this is to inoculate our Indians with "nordic" blood or to accustom them to a worthier existence. We know, however, that the proposal proves that these gentlemen approach the problem from the wrong angle.

Never has a European immigrating into Bolivia become or, at least, remained a working farmer. It is, furthermore, highly problematical whether white immigrants will want to establish themselves on the high plateaux. They have always preferred the districts near the Ocean, the rich lands of the neighboring countries—Argentina, Chili, Uruguay, Brazil, which are far from being overpopulated. Where is the European immigrant who will go to work in the frightful conditions accepted by the native agricultural laborers and cultivate the domains of backward proprietors for starvation wages? The defects of our rural population will only disappear when the economic and social circumstances creating them will have been transformed.

They Want Revenge

On the texture of these hardly resplendent facts was grafted the ruin brought by the war against Paraguay. As avowed in

Saavedra's pseudo-socialist manifesto, this reached the proportions of a major disaster. Yet the manifesto supports the desire for revenge now animating certain sections of the governing set. We read in Sr. Saavedra's proclamation: "Justice does not regulate relations between nations. Law is only a form of protection for the feeble and those who do not know to defend themselves. We have been a defenceless people who invoked justice but in vain. In our international conflicts, justice has never been accorded to us."

The Bolivian population realize the absurdity of the war into which it was dragged by its masters and those whom the latter serve. In the sterile struggle between Bolivia and Paraguay, the two peoples were almost annihilated economically. Reference is made here to the layers of the population who actually carried on the war and not those who dragged them into it. Yet the hatred between the Bolivians and Paraguayans, cleverly maintained by the press of each country and the leading preachers of revenge, renders problematical an early rapprochement between the formerly friendly countries.

The Chaco war—coming on the top of the misfortunes brought by the world crisis—is perhaps the bitterest experience that the masters of the country have wished on Bolivia since its beginning as an independent nation. The war has made the country's agricultural workers, its miners and oil field workers more miserable than they ever were before.

A minority of large proprietors, descendants of the "caciques" of the colonial epoch; a minority of intellectuals, sprung from the several rich merchant families, who direct now in their turn the political course of the country under the more or less hidden control of the foreign companies; and a mass of laborers breaking their backs on the estates of semi-feudal lords, in the mines owned by New York financiers—such is the picture of present day Bolivia, worn out by a crazy war of several years' duration.

Translated by R. T. y M.

WHAT NEXT IN SPAIN?

(continued from page 31)

"His popularity dates from the great Madrid meeting, which was a kind of signal for a reawakening of the country's left forces. Azaña was freed after being imprisoned for having found himself in Barcelona during the October outbreak. A meeting was organized in Madrid in his honor. At this meeting all organizations, from the bourgeois republicans to the anarchists, took part. The meeting was a huge success. It took place in an open lot on the outskirts of Madrid. About 500,000 persons were present. On the results of the meeting depended the suspensions or the continuation of the executions taking place. Since then Azaña was a great man, a popular savior.

"In short, Azaña finds himself now in a situation comparable to that of Lamartine at the beginning of the Revolution of 1848.

"Like Lamartine, Azaña is not a professional politician. He is a professor, an intellectual whom the Revolution threw into politics....

"If the lefts win in the coming elections, the president of the Council of the new Chamber will be Azaña. Now Azaña is a very moderate republican. He does not intend to do anything beyond the "agrarian reform" that has been voted by the Cortes. This is not much of a reform. It threatens only a small number of the large estates. It promises to give land to the peasants only upon the payment of heavy indemnities to the present proprietors. Finally the peasant will have to pay for this, and his lot will not be greatly improved.

"It is certain that the immense majority of those who now follow Azaña because he is a symbol of the struggle against Radical thievery and clerical fascism expect something more. The followers are far beyond their 'leader'. And he realizes that pretty well. But since he is an 'honest' man, he will refuse to abandon his own ideas to fulfill the expectations of those who have put him in power.

Translated by A. D.

From "Keishin Nichi-Nichi Shimbun", Tokyo.

Do we hear "Henry Pu Yi for Emperor?" A Chinese monarchy under Japanese "protection" is an early possibility. Shrewd, fatherly General Tada—he of the mellifluous style and homely figures of speech—can think them up fast.

What of the Kuomintang?

REPORTS have been circulating that Chiang Kai-shek has shown repentance and turned pro-Japanese, and those of the masses who consider these reports as possible to come to realization are mistaken in supposing that he has succeeded to a certain extent in the concentration of power and that with the attitude of the leading figure changed, all his associates and subordinates can follow suit. Is all this not a mixture of dreams and realities? As it is natural that no unanimous agreement is possible in all abstract discussions except in mathematics, so it follows that one should not force another to recognize the premises or conditions preceding a conclusion. But if these premises are well adjusted, their conclusion will naturally become unanimously accepted. We can not afford to overlook this important factor in connection with the unification of Japan's principle (concerning China). For our reference, therefore, we should study and discuss the reason why Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang cannot stand side by side with Japan.

We need not discuss here whether or not the motives behind "Abolish Unequal Treaties" and "Down with Imperialism" advocated since the inauguration of the Kuomintang are pure and proper. But when these slogans had succeeded in becoming a sort of belief, or creed, in the minds of Chinese young men, (who are regarded as patriots,) during the period of more than ten years since their introduction, the "Manchurian Affair" broke out. A large piece of territory was lost. All the hopes for its recovery have encountered a sudden, severe check. These young men have completely lost their "face." The leadership and policy of the Tangpu (the organ of the Kuomintang) have received a deadly blow, which has caused resentment and hatred to the degree easily imaginable.

Besides, Chiang Kai-shek himself has repeatedly proved unfaithful to Japan. It is a fact that since the "Tsinan Incident" he has been in friction with the Japanese influence. The Kuomintang, after repeated party-purge movements, has become the party of Chiang Kai-shek. It is wrong to have the impression that Chiang and the Kuomintang are separated and separable.

As already revealed, the new militarists associating with the Kuomintang and the Chekiang capitalists have resorted to the worst extortion of the Chinese people ever experienced in China. It needs no explanation that these squeezers of the masses cannot work together with Japan, whose aim is to promote the welfare of the masses. Therefore, it may be considered as a futile observation that Chiang Kai-shek, being an opportunist, will change his attitude when the general situation becomes unfavorable. For such change would spell submission, which act has the possibility of leaving behind a bad reputation for an indefinite period of time. Simultaneously, it would result in a complete alteration of the principle that has been made a creed, and that would be as bad as suicide. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and Chen Kuo-fu are loyal members of the Chiang-Soong clique. Their relations with the Chekiang capitalists and with British and American interests and their personal deposits largely in the British and American banks, all these and other factors clearly indicate that this clique is unable to shake hands with Japan, whose interests run counter to its interests.

Then there are evidences showing that in spite of the mandate of the National Government calling for friendly relations with Japan at the conclusion of the North China incident, anti-Japanese work continues in the dark, such as the disturbances caused by the Tangpu and the remnants of the Blue Shirts, the anti-Manchukuo acts secretly carried out by the Branch of the Mil-

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

tary Affairs Commission, and the work directed in secret by the Ministries of Industry, Railways, Finance, etc. of the Nanking Government to prevent Sino-Japanese co-operation. Granting that the responsible person would alter their attitude, it is feared that they can hardly change their protection color immediately. Nor is it easy for the lower social strata to uproot overnight the anti-Japanese ideas in which they have been steeped. Given a suitable length of time, they may be able to show better result. But it is regrettable that from the reliable evidences of their anti-Japanese actions in North China as have been given above, they have to be adjudged as entirely insincere.

Moreover, they are, as is proved by those facts mentioned in the foregoing, only vague tactics to put off the existing difficulty. Therefore, even if the Chinese recognize Manchukuo and discuss a certain number of outwardly vague tactics either under the pressure of Japan's force or on conditions mutually arrived at, they will, at a favorable moment, when the international situation undergoes some change, rely upon foreign influences to retaliate and attacks us with slogans such as "Abrogate the Unequal Treaties" and "Restore the Lost Territory."

The Communist Movement in China

The Red menace in China began with the incorporation of the Communist elements in the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek has repeatedly ordered party-purge movements since 1927 and succeeded in some measure, but Communist thoughts still prevail among the lower ranks of the Kuomintang. Although Chiang Kai-shek and his principal associates have degenerated into new militarists of a capitalistic character by joining hands with the Chekiang financiers, their organization, form, activities, etc., do not quite differ from those of the Communists. Consequently, Chiang Kai-shek has not obtained any result of importance after years of the anti-Red campaign. Complete suppression has become just as futile as pressing a rubber bladder half filled with the air, which will not break but swell up on one side when you apply pressure on the other. In fact the Red menace will become more serious, with the possible threat of the realization of the north western link of Szechwan, Tsinghai and Sinkiang, as desired by the Third International. It may not be too much to express the suspicion whether Chiang Kai-shek is conducting the anti-Red campaign in earnest or not.

Fundamentally, the Communist Party of China, especially what is known as Communist-bandits, is different from the Communist Party of Soviet Russia in purpose. Its chief characteristic being the fact that its members are largely peasants, it may just as well be regarded as an organized force formed in consequence of the maladministration of the Kuomintang, by poverty-stricken peasants and anti-Kuomintang elements with the object of finding the means of living with the aid from the real Communist Party. As for the Communist Party of Soviet Russia, naturally it is directing this force with a view to extending its influence. It is obvious that the longer the maladministration of the Kuomintang is allowed to continue, the poorer the peasants will be and the more wide-spread will the Communist-bandits become.

Whether China should be bolshevized has been the subject of much discussion since the time of the advent of the Kuomintang. Apart from the rebellions for dynasty changes in the history of China, there is a general impression among the lower classes of the people that they are entitled to follow the troops in the division of the wealth of the rich (to say nothing of the powerful land-

CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND JAPAN

● Major-General Hayao Tada

owners and corrupt gentry) in times of civil strife. This is tantamount to the initial idea of Communism. On the other hand, the Communist leaders of to-day, while directing their subordinates and the masses on lines of Communism of a primitive nature, are themselves enjoying a share of the spoils. This fact is sufficient to show that they are degenerating into a sort of militarists, and it may be further pointed out that if there is none of such spoils as their object, they may possibly become entirely degenerated. Communism in Russia is only possible under the strict pressure of the OGPU and the Red Army. In China, however, such controlling organs can not exist, the failure of the Blue Shirts of Chiang Kai-shek being an example. It is, therefore, doubtful whether a true Communist regime can be set up throughout China. Judging from the Chinese national character, even if Communism takes the whole of China by storm, it will of necessity die out like a storm. But the pain and sorrows to be inflicted upon the masses at the stage of chaos and the serious effects upon our Empire will not permit us to adopt the attitude of "watching a fire on the opposite bank of a river." Particularly, precaution should be taken against the tactics that Soviet Russia employs in using the Reds in China as tools in plotting against our Empire.

Since the rampancy of the Communist movement, especially of the communist-bandits in China, is as told above, the result of the maladministration of the Kuomintang, the remedy lies in reforming its corrupt government, that is, lightening the burdens of the people, saving them from further oppression, and at least safeguarding their means of living. It is the common object of the efforts of both the Japanese and Chinese peoples to check the Communist menace, relieve the masses of China, and effect a radical improvement of the existing administrative system. The organization of the Kuomintang, as previously stated, is more or less similar to the Soviet system. China is, therefore, more likely to become pro-Russia than pro-Japan at the end of her resources, contrary to the anticipation of some Japanese people. Latest information indicates that symptoms to that effect are not lacking. Attention should be drawn to clear evidences that Chiang Kai-shek is seeking an alliance with the Soviets, receiving the latter's assistance in an attempt to impart the policy of Japan.

"Extend the Paradise!" says Tada

In a word though no worry need be attached to the Communist Party of China, the activities of Soviet Russia in making use of that party and thereby bringing pressure to bear upon the Japanese Empire should be watched carefully in order to avoid errors. To minimize the activities of Communism, it is necessary to enable the Chinese peasants to rid the masses of all the possibilities of being bolshevized, and the requisite condition of this is improvement of the administrative system.

It has been stated previously that as long as Chiang Kai-shek and his clique continue to dominate China, there can be no hope of the adoption of a friendly policy toward Japan within their sphere of influence, even if Japan holds a fair and just policy. Therefore the Japanese Empire should act independently and disregard their pretenses by starting to create a paradise for co-existence and mutual prosperity between the two countries out of a zone where the China policy will be adopted. That paradise will be extended by degrees to such an extent that China will have to change her attitude sincerely or even they (Chiang and his clique) will not be permitted to exist.

North China at present is the district where the above-men-

tioned policy can be most easily and quickly carried out. At the same time, it undoubtedly constituted the zone of necessity. So the first step to enforce the national policy is to make North China a land of peace where the Chinese and the Japanese can live in peace and enlightenment, a market where Chinese and Japanese commodities and capital will not be subject to jeopardy but circulated freely—a paradise for co-existence and mutual prosperity of the two nations. Such a step will help the healthy growth of Manchukuo in the north and demonstrate to that part of China lying to the south that the happy state of mutual dependence for existence and the cooperation among Japan, China and Manchukuo with the Empire as the centre of gravity can warrant peace in Eastern Asia. Such is the importance of the North China question, upon which depends the success of the outward expansion of the Japanese Empire.

Said Jimmu-Tenso the First

The Imperial Rescript issued by Jimmu-tenso, the first Emperor of Japan regarding his government reads as follows:—"In following the virtues conferred upon myself by the Heaven and the promptings for bringing up my subjects, I should embrace the universe and dominate the corners of the earth". This reveals that our Emperors have regarded the virtues of justice and righteousness as the basis of government. Acting upon these virtues, they have been internally building a righteous nation and externally hoping in earnest for the unification of moral forces in the world. It becomes evident that in this is embodied the spirit of our government and the belief of the (Yamato) race. In regard to the overseas expansion of our Empire, we may look back into history and find that in spite of a few instances of success in stopping upon the continent we have met for inevitable reasons many reverses and withdrawals, such as the conquest of Korea by the Japanese Empress Jingō (in A. D. 200), the establishment of the Nihon Mu in Mimana (in 32 B. C.), the invasion of Korea by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (in 1592) and, more recently, the attack on Tsingtao (in 1914) and the expedition to Siberia (in 1918). Should the present movements of expansion like the founding of Manchukuo and the development of North China fail, we would not only retreat from the continent, but the destiny of the nation and the people would hang in the balance. We should, therefore, study the causes of our past failure and not repeat our errors. Without going into details, we must take up the following as our motto:—

1. As an individual and as a nation we need to have a dauntless spirit to push forward under any circumstances.
2. As an individual and as a nation we cannot realize co-existence and mutual prosperity unless we have acquired the magnanimous spirit of reflection and self-reproach.
3. The life of the Japanese nation should run as prosperously and everlastingly as the life of the earth and we should not be governed by immediate profits and losses to hasten our success.
4. Regarding the expansion of the Japanese Empire we should stand firm on our ground and adopt the policy of "ascending step by step" (and sometimes a few steps at a stretch). Once ascending, we are bound not to fall down. We should not place ourselves in the position of one who rides an elevator, descending as fast as ascending.

To sum up in order to carry out our belief in conformity with the great spirit of our government we must possess these factors: justice, patience and courage.

CREDIT, CRISES, TRUSTS

• Rosa Luxemburg

Chapter Two of "Reform or Revolution".

Can Credit Save Capitalism?

ACCORDING to Bernstein, the credit system, the new means of communication and capitalist combines are important factors enabling capitalist economy to adapt itself.

Credit has diverse functions in capitalism. Its two most important functions are to extend production and to facilitate exchange. When the inner tendency of capitalist production to extend unboundlessly strikes against the restricted dimensions of private property, credit appears as a means of surmounting these limits in a particularly capitalist manner. It combines into one magnitude of capital a large number of individual capitals—through shareholding societies. It makes available to each capitalist the use of other capitalists' money—in the form of industrial credit. And as commercial credit, it accelerates the exchange of commodities and therefore the return of capital into production, and thus the entire cycle of the process of production. The manner in which these two principal functions of credit influence the formation of crises is quite obvious. If crises appear as a result of the contradiction existing between the capacity of extension or the tendency to extension—possessed by capitalist production and the restricted view of what was stated above, the specific means of making this contradiction break out as often as possible. To begin with it increases unproportionately the capacity of extension of production and thus constitutes the inner motive force that is constantly pushing production to exceed the limits of the market. But credit strikes from two sides. After having (as a factor of the process of production) provoked overproduction, credit (as a factor of exchange) destroys, during the crisis, the very productive forces it itself created. At the first symptom of the crisis, credit melts away. It abandons exchange where it is still indispensable.

It shows up, ineffective and useless, where some exchange still continues, and reduces to a minimum the consumption capacity of the market.

Besides having these two principal results, credit influences the formation of crises in the following ways. It constitutes the technical means of making available to an entrepreneur the capital of other owners. It stimulates at the same time the bold and unscrupulous utilization of the property of others. That is, it brings to speculation. Credit not only aggravates the crisis in its capacity as a dissembled means of exchange. It also helps to bring and extend the crisis by transforming all exchange into an extremely complex and artificial mechanism having a minimum of metallic money as a real base and easily disarranged at the least occasion.

So that credit, instead of being an instrument for the suppression or the attenuation of crises, is on the contrary a particularly mighty instrument for the formation of crises. It cannot be anything else. Credit eliminates the remaining rigidity of capitalist relations. It introduces everywhere the greatest elasticity possible. It renders all capitalist forces extensible, relative and mutually sensitive to the highest point. Doing this it facilitates and aggravates crises, which are nothing more or less than the periodic collisions of the contradictory forces of capitalist economy.

That, however, leads us to another question. Why does credit generally have the appearance of "means of adaptation" of capitalism? No matter in what relation or form this "adaptation" is represented by certain people, it can manifestly consist only of the power to suppress one of the several antagonistic relations of capitalist economy, that is, of the power to suppress or attenuate one of these contradictions, and of allowing liberty of movement

at one point to the otherwise fettered forces. The fact is, however, that it is precisely credit that aggravates these contradictions to the highest degree. It aggravates the antagonism between the mode of production and the mode of exchange by stretching production to the limit and at the same time paralyzing exchange at the least pretext. It aggravates the antagonism between the mode of production and the mode of appropriation by separated production from ownership, that is, by transforming the capital employed in production into "social" capital and at the same time transforming a part of the profit, in the form of interest on capital, into a simple title of ownership. It aggravates the antagonism existing between the relations of property (ownership) and the relations of production by gathering into a small number of hands immense productive forces and expropriating a large number of small capitalists. Lastly it aggravates the antagonism existing between the social character of production and private capitalist ownership by rendering necessary the intervention of the State in production.

In brief, credit reproduces all the fundamental antagonisms of the capitalist world. It accentuates them. It precipitates their development and thus pushes the capitalist world forward to its destruction. The prime act of capitalist adaptation, as far as credit is concerned, should really consist in the breaking and suppression of credit. As it really is, credit is far from being a means of capitalist adaptation. It is, on the contrary, a means of destruction of the most extreme revolutionary significance. Has not this revolutionary character of credit actually inspired plans of "socialist" reform? As such it has had some distinguished protagonists some of whom (Isaac Pereira in France), were, as Marx put it, half prophets, half rogues.

The Myth of the General Cartel

Just as fragile appears the second "means of adaptation", employers' organizations. According to Bernstein, such organization will put an end to anarchy of production and do away with crises through the regulation of production. The multiple repercussions of the development of cartels and trusts have not hereto been considered too carefully. But represent a problem that can only be solved with the aid of Marxist theory.

One thing is certain. We could speak of a damming up of capitalist anarchy through the agency of capitalist combines only in the measure that cartels, trusts, etc. became, even in an approximate way, the dominant form of production. But such a possibility is excluded by the very nature of cartels. The final economic aim and result of combines is the following. Through the suppression of competition inside of a given branch of production, the distribution of the mass of profit realized on the market is influenced in such a manner that there is an increase of the share going to this branch of industry. Such organization of the field can increase the rate of profit in one branch of industry at the expense of other, and that is precisely why it cannot be generalized.

When it is extended to all important branches of industry, it suppresses its own influence.

But within the limits of their practical application, the result of combines is the very opposite of the suppression of industrial anarchy. Cartels ordinarily succeed in obtaining this increase of profit, on the interior market, by producing at a lower rate of profit, for the foreign market, the supplementary portions of capital which they cannot utilize for domestic needs. That is to say they sell abroad cheaper than at home. The result is the sharpening of competition abroad,—the very opposite of what certain people propose to find. This is well demonstrated by the history of the world sugar industry.

The Use of Monopoly

Generally speaking, combines, treated as manifestation of the capitalist mode of production, can only be considered a definite phase of capitalist development. Cartels are nothing else, at bottom, than a means resorted to by the capitalist mode of production for the purpose of holding back the fatal fall of the rate of profit in certain branches of production. What method do cartels employ for this end? No other than that of keeping inactive a part of the accumulated capital. That is, they use the same method which in an other form is employed in crises. The remedy and the illness resemble each other as two drops of water. Indeed, the first can be considered the lesser evil only up to a certain point. When the outlets of disposal begin to shrink, and the world market has been extended to its limit and has become exhausted through the competition of the capitalist countries—and sooner or later that time is bound to come,—then the forced partial idleness of capital will reach such dimensions that the remedy will become transformed into a malady and capital, already pretty much “socialized” through regulation, will tend to revert again to the form of individual capital. In face of the increased difficulties of finding markets, each individual portion of capital will prefer to take its chance alone. At that time, the large regulating organizations will burst like soap bubbles and give way to aggravated competition.

In a note to the third volume of “Capital”, Engels wrote in 1894:

“Since the above was written (1865) competition on the world-market has been considerably intensified by the rapid development of industry in all civilized countries, especially in America and Germany. The fact that the rapidly and enormously growing productive forces grow beyond the control of the laws of the capitalist mode of exchanging commodities, inside of which they are supposed to move, this fact impresses itself nowadays more and more even on the minds of the capitalists. This is shown especially by two symptoms. First, by the new and general mania for a protective tariff, which differs from the old protectionism especially by the fact that now the articles which are capable of being exported are the best protected. In the second place it is shown by the trusts of manufacturers of whole spheres of production for the regulation of production, and thus of prices and profits. It goes without saying that these experiments are practicable only so long as the economic weather is relatively favorable. The first storm must upset them and prove, that, although production assuredly needs regulation, it is certainly not the capitalist class which is fitted for that task. Meanwhile the trusts have no other mission but to see to it that the little fish are swallowed by the big fish still more rapidly than before. (“Capital”, note 16, volume III, page 142, Kerr ed.).

In a general way, cartels, just like credit, appear therefore as determined phase of capitalist development, which in the last analysis aggravates the anarchy of the capitalist world and expresses and ripens its internal contradictions. They aggravate the antagonism existing between the mode of production and exchange by sharpening the struggle between the producer and the consumer, as is the case especially in the United States. They aggravate, furthermore, the antagonism existing between the mode of production and the mode of appropriation by opposing in the most brutal fashion, to the working class, the superior force of organized capital, thus increasing the antagonism between Capital and Labor.

Finally, capitalist combinations aggravate the contradiction existing between the international character of capitalist world economy and the national character of the State—in so far as they are always accompanied by a general tariff war, which sharpens the differences among the capitalist states. We must add to this the decidedly revolutionary influence exercised by cartels on the concentration of production, technical progress, etc.

In other words, when evaluated according to their final effects

on capitalist economy, cartels and trusts fail as means of adaptation. They fail to attenuate the contradictions of capitalism. On the contrary, they appear to be an instrument of greater anarchy. They encourage the further development of the internal contradictions of capitalism. They accelerate the moment of a general capitalist decline.

Why Crises?

But if the credit system, cartels, etc. do not suppress the anarchy of capitalism, why have we not had a major commercial crisis for two decades, since 1873? (This was written in 1900 and revised in 1907.) Is this not a symptom demonstrating that, contrary to Marx's analysis, the capitalist mode of production has adapted itself—at least, in a general way—to the needs of society? Hardly had Bernstein rejected, in 1898, Marx's theory of crisis, when a profound general crisis broke out in 1900, and seven years later, a new crisis, beginning in the United States, seized the world market. Facts proved the theory of “adaptation” to be false. They showed at the same time that the people who abandoned Marx's theory of crisis only because no crisis occurred within a certain space of time merely confused the essence of this theory with one of its secondary exterior aspects—the ten year cycle. However, the description of the cycle of modern capitalist industry as a ten year period was to Marx and Engels, in 1860 and 1870, only a simple statement of facts. It was not based on a natural law but on a series of given historic circumstances joined to the fast spreading activity of young capitalism.

The crisis of 1825, was in effect, the result of the extensive investment of capital in the construction of roads, canals, gas works, which took place during the preceding decade, particularly in England, where the crisis broke out. The following crisis of 1836-1839 was, similarly, the result of heavy investments in the construction of means of transportation. The crisis of 1847 was provoked by the feverish building of railroads in England (from 1844 to 1847, in three years, the English Parliament gave railway concessions to the value of close to 15 billion dollars). In each of the three mentioned cases, a crisis came when new bases for capitalist development were established. In 1857, the same result was brought about by the abrupt opening of new markets for European industry in America and Australia, after the discovery of the gold mines, and the extensive construction of railway lines, especially in France, where the example of England was then closely imitated. (From 1852 to 1856, new railway lines to the value of 1,250 million francs were built in France alone). And finally we have the great crisis of 1873—a direct consequence of the first boom of large industry in Germany and Austria, which followed the political events of 1866 and 1871.

Every time up to now the sudden extension of the domain of capitalist economy and not its shrinking was the cause of commercial crisis. That the international crises repeated themselves precisely every ten years was a purely exterior fact, a matter of chance. The Marxist formula for crises as presented by Engels in “Anti-Duehring” and by Marx in the first and third volumes of “Capital”, applies to all crises only in the measure that it uncovers their international mechanism and general profound causes.

Crises may repeat themselves every ten or five years, or even every twenty or eight years. But what proves best the falseness of Bernstein's theory is that it is in the countries with the greatest development of the famous capitalist “means of adaptation”—credit, developed communications and trusts—that the last crisis (1907-1908) was most violent.

The belief that capitalist production could “adapt” itself to exchange presupposes one of two things. Either the world market can spread unlimitedly, or, on the contrary, the development of the productive forces is so fettered that it cannot pass beyond the bounds of the market. The first hypothesis constitutes a material impossibility. The second is rendered just as impossible by the

constant technical progress that daily creates new productive forces in all branches.

Big and Small Capitalists

There remains still another phenomenon which, according to Bernstein, contradicts the course of capitalist development as it is indicated above. That is the "steadfast phalanx" of middle-size enterprises. He sees in that a sign that the development of large industry does not move in a revolutionary direction and that is not as effective from the angle of the concentration of industry as was expected by the "theory" of collapse. He is here, however, the victim of his own lack of comprehension. To the progressive disappearance of the middle-size enterprise as a result of the development of large industry is to misunderstand sadly the nature of this process.

According to Marxist theory, small capitals play in the general course or capitalist development the role of pioneers of technical change. They possess that role in a double sense: they initiate new methods of production in well established branches of industry; they are instrumental in the creation of new branches of production, not yet exploited by the big capitals. It is false to imagine that the history of the middle-size capitalist establishments proceeds, in a rectilinear order, in the direction of progressive disappearance. The course of this development is on the contrary purely dialectical and moves constantly among contradictions. The middle capitalist layers find themselves, just like the workers, under the influence of two antagonist tendencies, one ascendant, the other descendent. In this case, the descendent tendency is the continued rise of the scale of production, which overflows periodically the dimensions of the average size parcels of capital and removes them repeatedly from the terrain of world competition. The ascendant tendency is, first, the periodic depreciation of the existing capital which lowers always again, for a certain time, the scale of production, in proportion to the value of the necessary minimum amount of capital. It is represented, besides, by the penetration of capitalist production into new spheres. The struggle of the average size enterprise against big Capital can not be considered a regularly proceeding battle, in which the troops of the weaker party continue to melt away directly and quantitatively. It should be seen as a periodic mowing down of the small enterprises, which rapidly grow up again, only to be mowed down again by large industry. The two tendencies play ball with the middle capitalist layers. The descending tendency must win in the end. The very opposite is true about the development of the working class. The victory of the descending tendency must not necessarily show itself in absolute numerical diminution of middle-size enterprises. It must show itself, first, in the progressive increase of the minimum amount of capital necessary for the functioning of the enterprises in the old branches of production; second, in the constant diminution of the interval of time during which the small capitalists conserve the opportunity to exploit the new branches of production. The result, as far as the small capitalist is concerned, is progressively shorter duration of his stay, in the new industry and a progressively more rapid change in the methods of production as a field for investment. For the average capitalist strata, taken as a whole, you have a process of more and more rapid social assimilation and disassimilation.

Bernstein knows this perfectly well, and furthermore comments on this himself. But what he seems to forget is that this very thing is the law of the movement of the average capitalist enterprise. If one admits that small capitalists are pioneers of technical progress, and if it is true that the latter constitute the vital pulse of the capitalist economy, then it is manifest that small capitalists are an integral part of capitalist development, and they will disappear only with capitalist development. The progressive disappearance of the middle-size enterprises—in the absolute sense considered by Bernstein—would signify not, as the latter thinks, the revolutionary course of capitalist development, but precisely the contrary, that is to say, a cessation, a

MONTHERLANT BEGINS TO TAKE SIDES

• Aragon

SERVICE INUTILE: Henri de Montherlant, Bernard Grasset, Paris.

THIS book, by one of our foremost contemporaries, comes to the light of day at a moment which is extremely critical for the French intellectuals, as they are being rent, against the grain, into two unequal, jagged sections. Writers who, like Mac Orlan, for example, were believed to be on the whole with the left, are drinking tea with the royalists. On the other hand, lines are becoming sharper within the ranks of what was roughly considered to be the right. This is not understandable merely as a result of the Italo-Ethiopian War, for it reveals in reality a long thought process which was only biding its time...

"Service Inutile" is a collection of articles written during the last decade. Several quick-tongued critics have declared the foreword to be of greater interest than the matter that follows it. That is what I call superficial judgment. Even if the foreword gave us the key to the book, it would be but a piece of purely academic summery without the moments of the author's thought, which extend over a period of ten years. Lovers of quick solutions will not get much out of reading "Service Inutile", which, on the other hand, allows them to find out the truth without all the stumblings of those men who after having, under given social conditions set foot on the heights of human thought, feel the contradictions of a world which is often already out of sight, just as the seaman on the highest yardarm feels the augmented pitching of the vessel. But this new book takes on inestimable importance in the eyes of all who realize the place occupied in our literature by a novel such as the same author's "Les Célibataires" (The Unwedded), "Service Inutile" is one of the most astounding documents of the tragedy of the French intelligence in this time of wars and revolutions, and even now throws some light on its future.

This book has been greeted with every shade of ill will, including the silence of what is popularly denominated as the "big press", which surely plays the game when avowedly revolutionary works are in question but has caused the raising of many eyebrows by its treatment of the work of a man who unites within himself two qualities which are often mutually hostile, that of being awarded by the French Academy the Grand Prize in literature, and that of being a great writer.

Where "Les Célibataires" appeared, I patted myself on the back for having extended my hand to Henri de Montherlant from the very columns of "Humanité". I pictured him with a big book under his arm at the crossroads of the world, faced in one direction by the glories and traditions of what had been, in the other by the rapture of what was to be. I saw that though he was a born-and-bred aristocrat, he was unresigned to bourgeois law, and would not hesitate to let himself be seduced by practically anything that seemed to be at loggerheads with bourgeois falsehood. Still, that is equivalent to saying that the novelty of the mask of fascism might nonetheless have charmed his eyes against seeing the true, radiant face of the future. Essentially, however, because I am a believer in the dynamics of history, not its abstract force, but the force of the men who are the flesh-and-

slowing down of this development. "The rate of profit, that is to say, the relative increase of capital", said Marx, "is important first of all for new investors of capital, grouping themselves independently. And as soon as the formation of capital falls exclusively into a handful of big capitalist, the revivifying fire of production will become extinguished.—It will die away."

Translated by O. G.

blood personifications of its onward march, and in the force of that class which is the prime mover and vanguard of the march, I did not even in the days of "Les Célibataires" think twice before indicating to Montherlant that his place in the future lay with that class.

Does the above signify that "Service Inutile" confirms the validity of such an assertion? Far from it, if you wish to stick to the letter of the text of the book. Absolutely, if you follow its line of development.

Let us not lose any time over those points which would demand a study as long as the book itself and which, nevertheless, show a Montherlant who has come a long way since "Les Olympiques": "Sports cannot by themselves play the educational role attributed to them by certain people. Sports are what custom makes them. And custom is what the public powers make or allow it to be."

Nor shall we stay long with this anecdote, revealing though it be."

"A new daily was looking for a name. I said to a member of the future publication that I didn't have a single idea about the matter, but I could still suggest a title that would ship the newspaper off with flags flung. Neither secret funds, connections, the ability of the staff, not anything under the sun would help one whit. It wouldn't be able to stir from dock. 'My word!' What is your title? he asked. 'Call it Honor.'"

As the years rolled by, Montherlant grew aware of the world in which he lived and the need of changing that world, though he is still poles removed from the discovery of the means to so salutary an end. He himself holds as pure whimsy such propositions as the one for the erection of a monument to those who were vanquished at Algiers. Truth to tell, he is not so much set on the statue as he is on getting people to talk about it. He as yet sets before us moral problems; what we ought to know is who it is that feels hot under the collar at the mention of these problems.

No more is it possible that in the future Montherlant may be on the side of French fascism. This is not so much true because of the stand he has taken on the colonial question. There can be no return. His experience resembles to a degree that of Gide in the Congo. It so happens that Montherlant has lived in Algeria. He had in 1925 embarked for Morocco—but let us hear the words from his own mouth:

"Since the armistice I had dwelled shut in my war memories (foolishly idealized, I suppose), just as did Don Quixote in his romances of chivalry. But, once in Africa, I recognized that, if there was such a thing as duty, it was not to hack the 'infidels' in two, but to take their defence. The latter was the role of justice and even courage. The native question became suddenly the only one that could hold me in North Africa. In March, 1930 I began 'Rose de Sable' (Rose of the Desert), on which I spent two painful years. They were painful because I was being torn in twain. How dreadful is the struggle between fatherland and justice!"

Fear of inconveniencing his native land kept Montherlant from printing the book, which is according to him an attack upon the colonial principle itself. For this scruple he has been not a little criticized, strangely enough even by the right. As for myself, I maintain that the vital point is that Montherlant has thought about certain affairs, and this he has not been able to do with impunity. Will he publish "Rose de Sable"? It is my fondest hope that he will some day find one does no harm to one's fatherland in fighting to overthrow imperialism. Imperialism places in the hands of the few the fatherland of the many, whose interests, as is known to Montherlant (fragments of the "Rose" printed in "Marianne" so testify) are the interests of the oppressed natives of the North Africa, whom he has learned to love with all his heart.

Finally, there is an ineradicable gap between Montherlant and the partisans of reaction, who may or may not be bedecked and bedizened with the trappings of fascism; this gap is the colonial question. Nor can he subscribe to the doctrine of racial inferiority. The subject of war should not go unmentioned. The Montherlant who, in his earlier years, entered the war with the expectation

of finding rapture, is no more. He will no longer walk beside those for whom war expresses in different garb the need to dominate. In his own words, he has begun to love the vanquished, a punishable misdemeanor on the right.

With characteristic frankness Montherlant said a short while ago to me that he didn't know one bit about the social question at home. He was only too correct. Montherlant comes from the very heart of a class to whose interest it is that its most honest sons know not "one bit about the social question at home". The whole book shows traces of this, so that it would be not in the least difficult to make a leftist criticism. I say without irony towards a man whose elevation of thought I respect, that Montherlant has to break a lot of ground before he even gets at many leftist ideas which are the common property of every Tom, Dick and Harry. Thought standing at the highest point of a culture, Montherlant is acquainted with some basic concepts, which, when they become known to him, will very likely orientate his thought with all the impact of the last decade's African revelation. And that is just what many of us expect to happen with him.

Somebody will say to me that I am mistaken: there is in the specific case of Montherlant nothing but an aristocrat's enthusiasm for Spain, which stands for a certain pride, and beyond that, an enthusiasm for Islam. A number of pages in "Service Inutile" ostensibly support such a thesis, and so, neglecting that which is more akin to my purpose, I shall concentrate only on the question just posed. Take the trouble to read "Tragédie d'Espagne" (Tragedy of Spain) and the article "Pour le chant profond" (For the Deep Song). You will probably discover a doubtful symbolism if you take as ought but parable the speech Montherlant puts in the base mouth of Alphonso XIII. He chases, without doubt, in the Spanish metaphor, after the will o' the wisp of the fate of aristocracies, for that is a province in which for him all is not quiet. In it I see in addition the expression of a disappointment which still has to smile at the attitude of aristocracies ready to renounce everything for the maintenance of their advantages. At the same time I see the attraction exercised on the poet not by the social aristocracy but by the people, and this is given form in the young virtuoso who has sung once before the court and would not start over again for all the sun shines on.

Now you are going to shout at me: He is not taken up with his own people, but with the Spanish, the Arabs, for his birth, tastes and traditions place him worlds away from the French worker, for example, and the talents latent in the French working class. That is making a mountain out a molehill.

To express the Arab people and the deep song he bore within himself from Morocco to Andalusia, Montherlant has hit upon words that come so straight from the heart that they, more than any idea to be found in the book, contain for me the pith of "Service Inutile". In them I see the promise of Montherlant's future development. Well does he know that the deep song arising from the people is the light over a buried treasure, the prayer of some profound human reality desiring its liberation. He who has once taken to himself this prayer can devote his life to naught but the wished for liberation.

Ay, Montherlant, you have taken to yourself the song of the oppressed, and of that, as of the canto jondo, heard in 1925 in Seville, we shall say with you that "a horse quenching its thirst would have lifted its head to listen". What if the first oppressed ones you heard were Arabs? Our duty is to thank them. If it is in Arabian notes that the song has found the highroad to your heart, it has been found, and that is what counts. Take this road; it is yours. Lend aid to Africa's voice in its ascent from earth. Fight for and with those who have been able to sing the heroic chorus that lurking in your breast. A day will come, and it is not distant, when just as during the days of the Ethiopian War your name was on a hundred tongues, so, as you will find without astonishment, will it be on the tongues of millions of men who in the workshops of France will be building a new and better world.

Translated by D. Fragonard.

KING EDWARD VIII AND CLASS STRUGGLE

What did diplomatic Litvinov whisper into the young king's ear? And what did Edward drop into Litvinov's ear? Maybe the next issue of the "International Review" will tell. Meanwhile, here are the royal facts as spilled by the editors of the I. L. P. "New Leader".

ROYALTY in Britain is supposed to play no part in political controversy. In actual fact, it plays a very influential part behind the scenes. This was illustrated in the life of the late King.

In political circles it is stated that the King used his personal influence:—

To support Ulster against the Home Rule Bill in 1914.

To support intervention against Soviet Russia in 1919.

To secure the restoration of King George of Greece.

To advance the Hoare-Laval Peace Pact in order to save the Italian Royal Family.

It is inevitable that the Monarchy, surrounded by aristocratic influences, trained among Army and Naval officers, related by marriage with the ruling Houses of the Continent, should be identified in sentiment with privilege and reaction.

Russian Aristocrats

The last Czar of Russia was the cousin of the late king, and it was natural that the dispossessed aristocracy of Russia should look to Buckingham Palace for protection. The association became closer and more open after the marriage of the Duke of Kent to Princess Marina.

Professor Harold Laski, a Constitutional expert, has proved how the late King was used, contrary to Constitutional precedent, in the political crisis of 1931 to oust the Labour Government.

What part will the new King play?

A few years ago there was a rumor that the Prince of Wales was personally unsympathetic to the Court and its artificial seclusion and ritual.

During the miner's strike of 1926 he did not hide his sympathy with the men. When he visited a northern coalfield he upset the local aristocracy by his outspoken comments, and the report of his visit was never published. A proposal that he should make a similar visit to South Wales was killed.

But recently there has been a different tendency. It is rumoured that he has come under the influence of circles with Fascist tendencies.

Edward and Fascism

In June he made the proposal that the British Legion should send a deputation of friendship to the Nazi ex-servicemen's organizations in Germany. The proposal was immediately welcomed by Hitler, Goering, and other Fascist leaders, and when it went to Germany the British Legion deputation was greeted with all the paraphernalia of Fascism.

The prince followed this by a speech during the same month extolling the Officers' Training Corps and describing those who oppose it as "misguided" and "cranks."

British Fascism will take a superficial form different from that of the Continent. There are astute members of the privileged class who see in the popularity of the new Bachelor King a means for their use.

The impartiality of the Monarchy has always been a myth. As the class struggle develops, the institution of Royalty will inevitably line itself with privilege against the people.

THE POLITICAL FOG IN FRANCE

AT its recent extraordinary meeting, the Executive Committee of the Radical-Socialist Party of France chose to its presidency M. Edouard Daladier and voted with one dissenting vote the following resolution, which was practically the beginning of Laval's fall:

"The Executive Committee expresses to president Daladier its affectionate confidence and its willingness to serve, at his side, the indispensable unity of the Radical and Radical-Socialist Party.

"It thanks president Herriot for outlining the peace doctrine of the Radical Party and for struggling tenaciously to defend the Republic against the Leagues.

"It condemns the contemptible campaign carried on by the Right against Herriot and approves the motives that led him to leave the ministry.

"It declares that the ideas and methods of the president of the Council are in absolute opposition to the doctrine defined at the Congress of Wagram, especially in regards to the maintenance of world peace through the League of Nations, the maintenance of civil peace through the effective disarmament of the factions and the struggle against the crisis by substituting the right to work for the privileges of money.

"It calls on its elected representatives and militants to apply, in a complete and cordial union, the party doctrine of a vigilant defence of the Republic and of Peace..."

And this is the response of the reactionary M. de Kerillis in his "Echo de Paris":

"M. Laval should remain and appeal to the country against the coup d'état by the factions and the "Soviet". He had a 64 majority in the last vote. That was 63 too many. A majority of one is enough. Such is the law of numbers and it alone should rule in a democracy."

But said Leon Blum in the "Populaire":

"It (the election of Daladier) moves the Radical Party toward the left. It orientates it, for the next few weeks and especially during the election campaign, toward the common desire for democratic defence and social rebirth symbolized by the Popular Front... It will rouse a new hope in the popular masses."

And Vaillant-Couturier in the "Humanité":

"What comes out of the Executive Committee is the unanimous adhesion of the Radical Party to the Popular Front and to Herriot's policy of respect for the pact and Franco-Soviet rapprochement. We have here an unequivocal affirmation of unity and an unquestionable condemnation of Laval, who is supported by the factions. The decisions of the Executive Committee have clarified the situation."

But now that a Popular Front government seems likely, says Gitton, the secretary of the Communist Party:

"In an attempt to present the Popular Front as a "Communist, Socialist, Bourgeois Republican" bloc, some people want to lead to vulgar ministerial participation within the present framework of bourgeois legality, that is to say, to participation in a bourgeois

So in 1919 the King stopped revolution!

And when the war was ended, when the thought
Of revolution took its hideous place,

His courage and his kindness and his grace
Scattered (or charmed) its ministers to naught.

*From the official memorial poem to King George V
by John Masefield, the Poet Laureate.*

NAZI CINEMA

• Andre Kalen

From "Le Rouge et le Noir" Brussels.

The famous Belgian intellectual pushes aside his hatred of Nazism to study the Hitlerian moving pictures. One can only wonder whether it is his typical enthusiasm for the new or a keen sense of detail that enables him to descry something fresh and unusual in the last cinema productions of the Third Reich.

IN spite of all measures taken for centralization and "normalization"—the ubiquitous "Gleichschaltung"—the German films of today furnish us valuable information. We shall not consider commercial productions. They can no longer hide their poverty of inspiration. We shall only discuss the direct products of the new ethics, whose manifest preoccupation is to relegate psychoanalysis, complexes, freaks, to the rank of discreet accessories.

Under a veneer of official propaganda, the Nazi screen shows us today the aspirations of a people poisoned by myths, stifled by the smell of catastrophe, spied on by old generals and senile politicians, lying in wait for a revolution,—and evidently seeking pure air, freedom from memories and remorse...

Paris saw "Morgenrot", but the timorous modesty of our Belgian censor will probably forbid it. It is, nevertheless, an irreproachable document, exceptional in more than one way. No one dreams of denying the heroism of the submarine crews during the war. Coromandel, Scapa-Flow, and above all the pranks of the Emden, are exploits to which we cannot but pay homage. But there is more in this picture than homage to the combatants: we cannot fail to see an eloquent symbol in the opening scene. With slow gait, as though regretfully, a convoy of troops is leaving for the Front. No hand has ever better pictured the derisory "Nach Paris" imagined here and there. Suddenly its grisly aspect is hidden by a grinding, dominating train, covered interminably, almost to the point of obsession, with a bloody Red Cross...

How can we find in this German testimonial any exaltation of war when we hear the sailor's mother, after embracing him on his victorious return, reproach the populace for their joy at the announcement of his exploits. With a cutting word she stops the

government, a participation that conforms to the conception of the collaboration of classes as it is practiced by a number of Socialist parties and which has as a result the safeguarding of the regime. We, however, want to free the popular masses from the domination of the economic and financial oligarchies.

"Well, the Communists remain opponents of ministerial participation both before and after the elections. But we are quite ready to support a government that acts in conformity with the interests of the people."

To which the Socialist Lebas answers in the "Populaire":

"When the Communist Party decided on its participation in the Popular Front we did not expect that it would all of a sudden put forward as a primary condition of organic unity the condemnation of any coalition with the Republican Party. That seems to us to be a violent contradiction."

And Jean Zay in "Oeuvre":

"The Socialists have now passed to the left of the Communists, if we are to believe the revolutionary bids that some of them permit themselves in their proposal of unity. But their position is no less dubious. For only the support of the Radicals guarantees them a number of seats, in face of the rivalry of their Communist partners... As for the Communists—they expect to benefit from the "Standing Popular Front", yet they refuse to recognize its two logical consequences, which are a single (Socialist-Communist) slate of candidates and participation in the government. However, they will have to explain their change of tactics in the coming elections and not in the parliamentary backstage."

pedantic, bombastic mayor who evokes the memory of her dead sons getting all muddled in his ludicrous personifications. This achievement concerns only her son and herself and she refuses to let him be carried off for any purpose whatever. Apology for war? No—the exaltation of a certain bitter heroism which finds its sole justification from within! The war is only the frame which allows it to express itself. Can we always show this superiority in our own productions?

Though it is somewhat beyond the scope of this article, I want to mention a very strong picture: "The Cavalier", a drama of Friesland, telling of the selfsacrifice of peasants who, with their own hands, save the country from inundation, break the dike and divert the flood on to their own homes. The atmosphere is apocalyptic, with gripping scenic effects and marvellous vistas of a ghostly, desolate shore. Livid clouds and squalls... The torrent rolls on carrying everything with it. A white horse gallops away frenzied and is lost to sight on the horizon.

This is not the place to recall "Reifende Jugend" (Youth Overthrown), the acknowledged masterpiece of Carl Froelich, a type unusual today; nor "The Two Kings", in which the spirit of propaganda shows us less the atmosphere of the New Germany than a heavy, foggy Germanism, pretentious and decidedly out-of-date.

But we must say that scarcely had the German studios got rid of their impure elements than there came a rush of pedants, overflowing with good will, who thought only of photographing the minor potentates of the regime and flooded their films with military marches.

These neophytes all pretended to picture the National-Socialist legend. There were naive, clumsy panegyrics of the ill-fated racial hero Horst Wessel, of whom they made a sort of Lohengrin in a brown shirt. Of course, they displayed storm troops in great numbers and there was a monster demonstration in front of the "Brandenburger Tor" by way of deification.

But we must say that scarcely had the German studios got rid of Herr Goebbels thundered a major excommunication against it.

"Art that is worthy of the name", he declared, "does not spring from good will but from ability... the film seemed to me a succession, without logic or unity, of episodes mostly valueless, often even in contradiction of historic truth."

He brusquely added that the producers should consider less their bank account and think more of service to the German people.

In "Horst Wessel", only the musical score, tempestuous and magnificent, found favor in his eyes.

Perhaps we might explain this pitiless veto of the vacillating Minister of Propaganda by the crafty war he wages against the condottiere Goering, the inspirer of the film. At any rate it had the effect of discouraging a multitude of proselytes who possessed only rudimentary notions about the cinema.

"The Triumph des Willens" is of different caliber. It is a kind of stylization of the Congress of Nuremberg, which the official sentinel of the Third Reich, M. Riefenstahl, has pictured with an astonishing technique and with that sense of grandiose staging and mass handling of crowds which is responsible for the success of the Nazi movement.

In passing let us mention "Blutendes Deutschland" and "Ich fuer dich" among operettas, very pure, really poetical, productions concerning the women's work camps.

In "Um das Menschenrecht" the ingenuity of the partisan theme, is saved by an irreproachable presentation. "At the time of the Volunteer Bands" the subtitle, explains and one guesses at the tone: the youthful demobilized soldiers disheartened by chaos and anarchy, struggling for the resurrection of the Fatherland and the downfall of criminal democracy. If the producers of this simple, natural imagery had not been obsessed by the care for edification they could have drawn a master-piece depicting these catastrophic times when Germany was exasperated, and veterans of an other generation, old ritters sick of inaction, mingled with declasse youths disgusted with the provisional and ephemeral and trying to intoxicate themselves with nationalist exaltation in order to forget their restricted life. Without thought of the future they

followed any fanatic whatsoever, hunted down like dogs the best defenders of the new world or humbler victims in the Ruhr or Silesia, contemptuously defied criticism, shaped their political fortune with blood or rolled unknown beneath the blows of an anonymous vengeance. What a scathing and fierce epic could have been inspired by those bullies who signed "Fememoerder" on the register of the Reichstag! It is strangely distorting their true character to take such horrors and subordinate to an ideology characters like the Schlagetter of Hans Probst: "When I hear the word Kultur, I reach for my revolver."

We wish to dissociate "Hitlerjunge Quex" from the edifying series of films previously mentioned. Their heavy gravity gives place here to a taking dynamism that is aided by a theme reduced to its simplest expression:—"A story of the Spirit of Sacrifice of German Youth". It is the elemental story of young Heinrich Voelker, the son of Communists actively engaged in party politics, who feels himself out of place at home. The story pictures as precocious young blackguards adolescents who are merely out of focus and whom unemployment compels to live outside the vigorous and strong life which every young German desires.

The youth cannot overcome the irresistible sympathy which attracts him to this enthusiastic discipline, this ardent faith, those beautiful camp fires, those vibrant marching songs of Hitler's faithful. He rallies to the Nazi cause in spite of his father's fury and the threats of the "reds". Mrs. Voelker commits suicide by gas when her son is taken to hospital the victim of an attack. In the last scene, a street fight, Heinrich is killed. He falls, bathed in Nazi glory: flags, flags, and more flags, and a song which rings out:

"Our flag flies before us
Yes, our flag is greater than death".

The principal interpreter is Heinrich Georg, who was burned in effigy in "Berliner Alexanderplatz" where he was shown amidst a larval humanity, crawling among leprous ruins and oozing walls.

It is understood, there are no nuances in the contrasting of the two political parties: a party is "sky high" or it is "in the gutter". Wherever we see Communists there is something dark and disgusting—but the sun shines brighter as soon as a Nazi appears on the scene.

Such a method of presentation is puerile, but the staging is resplendent. Throughout this film there is an indefinable something which defies criticism. Can it be that M. Goebbels' injunctions have borne fruit?

Translated by Ann Bishop.

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WHO WILL BE MY SUCCESSOR ?

● Adolf Hitler

The "Neue Zuercher Zeitung" writes: "The passage in Hitler's speech at Detmold in which the chancellor stated that the question of a successor to his post as head of the State and Fuehrer of the party was already decided, was the talk of all Berlin. It is true that Hitler made no allusion to the identity of the future Fuehrer. The passage in question was officially suppressed in the newspapers. However, it was published by mistake in the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung", for which the management of the paper received a reprimand from the Minister of Propaganda.

YOU all well know that the future is not rosy. It will not strew our path with flowers. However, everything must be won through heavy labor. Everything that we need and everything that we ought to have will cost us in sacrifices. But final success always goes to those who remain masters of their nerves...

We must therefore always give proof to a decisive will. The Nazi party would not have won if it had not gone into the struggle armed with this single will. Today we have only one central authority that delegates power. This central authority can withdraw the power it has delegated in any case and to any person.

It is on a democratic base that we have won over our adversaries. I am convinced that today our enemies could not beat us on this base. Because this is the only thing left for them to try to do. I envisage the future with unlimited confidence. Every attempt to change the present regime in Germany is doomed to absolute defeat. All who try it in face of the argument of facts, will find that their efforts will break like glass.

The National-Socialist movement is no longer bound to any one person. We have today a regime in which the question of succession has already been decided, without leaving, as I said, the solution as to who will be the head of the State and the Fuehrer of the party to the will of one person.

I admit that the National-Socialist ideal, in its final form appears to all humanity as a polar star. But should not humanity always march in the direction of a star? I mean to say that as soon as it reaches this star, humanity no longer sees it. We are on the right road and we aim at a true goal.—From the recent speech of Hitler at Detmold.

Taken from "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung".

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